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I. SYNTHESIZING THEORY AND PRACTICE

To find a form that accommodates the mess, that is the task of
the artist now.
--Samuel Beckett1
Conventional wisdom finds that international banking law is an
applied field. In contrast to a traditional field like constitutional law,
in which well-developed bodies of literature exist that draw upon
feminist legal theory, critical race theory, law and economics, and
critical legal studies, international banking law seems bereft of jurisprudential perspectives.2 Finance professors may ruminate about whether

*

Associate Professor and Director, Graduate Program, School of Law, William and Mary.
Attorney, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1989-1993. Visiting Professor, Duke Law School,
spring 1996. A.B., Duke University, 1984; M.Sc., London School of Economics, 1985; M.Sc.,
Oxford University, 1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989.
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they offered on an earlier draft of this Article presented at a workshop on February 6, 1996. I
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Esq., Senior Vice President and Special Counsel for Strategic Development, Wachovia, WinstonSalem, N.C.; Professor George C. Christie, Duke Law School; Professor Davison M. Douglas,
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1. Conversation with John Driver, 1961. Quoted in DEIRDRE BAIR, SAMUEL BECKETT:
A BIOGRAPHY, 523 (1978). .
2. Consider, for example, a recent casebook and two recent treatises: HAL S. ScoTT & PHILIP
A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (2d ed. 1995), REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS (Michael
Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 2d ed. 1995), and PHIUP HAELUTZEL, INTERNATIONAL BANKING
LAW (1994). These excellent works cover a range of practical topics, ranging from Eurodollars to
how foreign banks are regulated in the U.S. But there is little effort to consider whether
jurisprudential concepts traditionally used in other fields of law might offer insightS into such
topics or the international banking system in general.
This observation is not meant as a criticism of the aforementioned works, and perhaps reflectS

1

2

Harvard International Law ]o11rnal I Vol. 38

exchange rates move in accordance with the interest rate parity theorem, but what possible contribution could legal theorists make to
understanding international banking?3 After all, legal theory is rarified
by nature and eschews gritty details. Practicing international banking
lawyers have little time for apparently non-money making ideas. Consequently, the conventional view of international banking law is that
it is about how cross-border transactions undertaken by commercial
banks wor0 and how banks are regulated to ensure the safety and
soundness of the international banking system.5
A "nuts and bolts" approach that follows conventional wisdom is
unduly narrow. The normative premise of this Article is that complex
and technical international banking law issues can be evaluated by
thinking in terms of fundamental concepts that animate in law generally and in non-legal disciplines. 6 Equilibrium is one such concept. The
equilibrium theory of international banking law developed in this
Article is inspired by neoclassical economic theory and its application
in the constitutional law context.
Why focus on equilibrium? Why worry about the international
banking law context? Because international banking lawyers seem to
practice in a state of learned helplessness at best, and cynicism at worst.
They have witnessed crisis after crisis in the 1990s: in 1991, the
spectacular Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) fraud; 7
in 1992-93, the overthrow of the world's central banks by private

the nascent state of scholacship in international banking law relative co ocher legal fields.
Moreover, ic would be incorrect co suggest chat extant scholarship in international banking law
is entirely descriptive. To the contrary, there are a number of fine analytical pieces in the field.
See, e.g., JOSEPH]. NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS (19!)5);
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE REGULATORY RESPONSE, Qohn
Finglecon ed., 1992).
3. The interest rate pariry theory says chat the interest rare associated with financial instru·
mencs in one country that are covered for exchange rare risk (e.g., through forward contracts)
should be the same as that for financial instruments in another country. Any difference in the
nominal races of interest of cwo currencies arises because of a premium or discount for one
currency relative co the ocher in the forward marker. In ocher words, premium and discount
points reflect interest rate differentials. See Raj Bhala, Risk Trade-Offi in the Foreign Exchange Spot,
Forward and Derivative Markets, 1 FINANCIER 34, 42-43 (1994); JEFF MADURA, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 187-95 (3d ed. 1992); J. 0RUN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS 84-96 (2d ed. 1991); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES 01'
CoRPORATE FINANCE 834 (3d ed. 1988); WILUAM R. FOLKS, JR. & RAJ AGGARWAL, lNTERNA•
TIONAL DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 39-40, 46-48 (1988).
4. See, e.g., ERNEST T. PATRIKIS ET AL., WIRE TRANSFERS (1993) (discussing the mechanics
of wire transfecs and wire transfer law).
5. See, e.g., RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI (1994) (discussing the
regulation of foreign banks in the U.S. in the wake of the BCO scandal).
6. This premise is arciculared to promote what Professor Rubin aptly calls "normative clarity.''
See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. Rnv.
889, 912-19 (1992).
7. See BHALA, supra note 5, at 3-23.
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foreign exchange traders in the markets for European currencies;8 in
1994, the stunning collapse of Barings Bank as a result of yen index
futures trading;9 in 1994-95, the enormotis devaluation of the Mexican
peso and consequent world-wide "tequila" effect on emerging stock
markets; 10 and in the securities trading losses and subsequent coverup

8. See GREGORY J. MillMAN, THE VANDALS' CROWN (1995); Christopher Young, Note, The
Ramification of the Exchange Rate CollapJe in Europe: Implicatiom for Monetary Union, 13 B.U. IN'I"L
L.J. 263 (1995); The Campaign for Sterling, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1993, at 52; Richard W.
Stevenson, Europeam' Currency SyJtem Shaken as Britain CutJ Free, N.Y. 1iMES, Sept. 17, 1992, at
Al.
9. See NICK LEESON, ROGUE TMDER (1996); Maximilian J.B. Hall, BaringJ: The Bank of
England'J FirJt Report to the Board of Banking SuperviJion, 11 BUTIERWORTHS]. INT'L BANKING
& FIN. L. 128 (Mar. 1996); Sara Calian, "Rogue Trader" SayJ Deceiving BaringJ Wasn't Difficult,
"Star" Statm Helped, WALL ST.]., Feb. 13, 1996, at A10; Nicholas Denton, U.K. Company NewJ:
A Remarkable Comeback to the Top of the TabltJ, FIN. 1iMES, Dec. 30-31, 1995; Maximilian J.B.
Hall 1 A Review of the Board of Banking SuperviJion'J Inquiry into the CollapJe of BaringJ-Part 2, 10
BUTIERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 470 (Nov. 1995); Maximilian ].B. Hall, A Review
of the Board of Banking SuperviJion'J Inquiry into the CollapJe of BaringJ-Part 1, 10 BuTIERWORTHS
J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 421 (Oct. 1995); Spot the Smoking Receivable, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21,
1995, at 79; Richard Dale, The Wider Lemm of BaringJ, 10 BUTIERWORTHS]. INT'L BANKING
& FIN. L. 355 (Sept. 1995); Who LoJt BaringJ?, ECONOMIST, July 22, 1995, at 16; BANK OF
ENGLAND, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS Quly 18, 1995); Hugh S. Pigott, Lmom from BaringJ,
10 BUTIERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 159 (Apr. 1995); Jason Fox & Diana Horrocks,
The CollapJe of Baring, 14 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 12 (1994); Nicholas Denton, Ex-BaringJ ExecutiveJ
Pace Singapore Summom, FIN. 1iMES, Dec. 30-31, 1994, at 22; Remarks by Eugene A. Ludwig,
Comptroller of the Currency, before the European Institute's International Roundtable Seminar,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency News Release 95-46, Apr. 28, 1995; Gone Dmch:
BaringJ, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1995, at 73; Broken Bank: BaringJ PLC OfjicialJ May Have Been
Aware of Trader'J PoJition, WALL ST. ]., Mar. 6, 1995, at A1; The Bank That DiJappeared,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1995, at 11; A Fallen Star, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1995, at 19; BaringJ Trader
Who Brought Down Bank SmfactJ in Germany, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1995, at A3; Glenn Whitney
& Michael R. Sesit, Dutch Giant Offers to Buy All of BaringJ, WALL ST.]., Mar. 3, 1995, at A3;
Steven Lipin & G. Bruce Knecht, How Many Other BaringJ Are There?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,
1995, at C1; Britain'J BaringJ PLC BetJ on DerivativeJ-And the CoJt lJ Dear, WALL ST. J., Feb.
27, 1995, at Al.
10. See Tim Carrington, Mexico'J Currency Devaluation ShowJ How an Economic Strategy Can Flop,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1995, at A2; Tim Carrington & Craig Torres, U.S. UnveilJ RtJrne Plan for
Mexico, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1995, at A3; Craig Torres, Mexico'J Debt-RtJtrocturing Plan StallJ,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1995, at A14; Zedillo'J Wake-Up Call, WALL ST.]., Feb. 14, 1995, at A22;
To the RtJrne, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 13; ScentJ From a Border: The Mexican RtJrne, EcoNoMIST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 24; Craig Torres, Mexico'J Central Bank StroggltJ as Foreign RtJervtJ Slump
to Low Leve!J, New Data Show, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at AS; Stephen Fidler & Leslie Crawford,
Mexican Concerm Shift to Damage Done by CriJiJ, FIN. 1iMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at 5; George Graham,
$50bn Aid for Mexico "Prevented Global CrniJ," FIN. 1iMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at 1; Thomas T. Vogel,
Jr., Mexico \VorritJ Spread To Emerging MarketJ, WALL ST.]., Jan. 31, 1995, at C1; The World'J
Emerging MarketJ All At Sea, EcoNOMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 67; RtJrning the Sombrero, EcoNOMIST,
Jan. 21, 1995, at 18; Quick Fix or Quagmire?, EcoNOMIST, Jan. 21, 1995, at 72; U.S. Plam to
Expand Help to Mexico; Loan GuaranteeJ May Reach $40 billion, WALL ST.]., Jan. 13, 1995, at A3;
Michael R. Sesit, Dollar DarwiniJm: Global Capital Crtmch IJ Beginning to PuniJh Some Weak
EconomitJ, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1995, at A1; The Egg on Zedillo'J Face, EcONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995,
at 31; Latin America in the Fallout Zone, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 59; Ted Bardacke, et al.,
Mexico'J MeasurtJ Fail to Calm Currency Markeu, FIN. 1iMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 1; Mexico Faces Market
TtJt, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 19.
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of those losses by Daiwa and Japanese authorities. 11 Lawyers dutifully
attempt to consider the legal repercussions of the crises. 12 But they
throw up their hands at the sight of the repercussions: more and
increasingly technical rules and regulations that land on their desks
and demand comprehension. They complain of a professional world of
constant "upheaval," "turmoil," and "chaos." Whatever control they
once may have had is lost. Even the international banking law scholar,
who has time for quiet reflection, admits it is "impossible to keep up."
These understandable reactions are not founded upon a sublime
theoretical perspective. They are not based on deep or systematic
thought about stability or change, much less the concept of equilibrium. Indeed, in contrast to scholars in other disciplines, lawyers have
not devoted much attention to this concept. Equilibrium is a familiar
concept to physical scientists. To them, it is a state of balance among
natural forces.H This balance may be static, as when a body is acted
upon by opposing forces whose net effect is zero, 14 or dynamic, as in
11. See New Thinking Suggests Banks Take Broader, Atttomated Approach to Controlling Expomre, 5
GLOBAL !NY. T.ECH. 10 (Mar. 1996); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, In the
Matter of The Daiwa Bank, Limited, Docker No. 95-028-T-FB, Amendment of Termination
Order (Feb. 2, 1996); William Dawkins, Tok;·o's top finance official qttits, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30--31,
1995, at 1; Daiwa Pursues Settlement Of U.S. Charges Against It, Whl.L ST. J., Dec. 22, 1995, at
A5; Something Nasty in the Woodshed, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1995, at 17; John Bussey, j.tpau's
Bungling Ministry of Finance, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995, at A14; Dairua attd the Fed, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 7, 1995, ar A22; Jathon Sapsford & Robert Steiner, Daiwa Effects Ripple throllghjapau's
Banking Industry, Whl.L ST.J., Nov. 6, 1995, ar A21; In a Signal to japan, U.S. Bars Daiwa Bauk,
Indicts It and Officials, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at A1; Joint Statement of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and New York
State Banking Department, Nov. 2, 1995; Norihiko Shirouzu, Daiwa Confirms it Told Trader to
Hide Losses, Whl.L ST. J., Ocr. 23, 1995, ar A14; Tok;·o Tells U.S. Reasons for Delay in Daiwa Report,
WALL ST. J., Ocr. 13, 1995, at All; japan Agency Let Daiwa Delay Report, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10,
1995, at A17; Daiwa Daze, Whl.L ST. J., Ocr. 9, 1995, at A12; Gerard Baker & Antonio Sharpe,
Daiwa Debacle Exacts High Price, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1995, ar 14; Gerard Baker, Daiwa's Tro11blcs
Deepen, FIN. TIMES, Ocr. 4, 1995, ar 8; Board of Governors of rhe Federal Reserve System, In
the Matter of The Daiwa Bank, Limited, Docket No. 95-028-C-FB, Order Issued Pursuant to
the New York State Banking Law and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended (Oct. 2,
1995); Wall Street Shokku, EcoNOMIST, Sept. 30, 1995, ar 83; Jathon Sapsford,japanase BankJ Get
New, Lower Ratings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1995, ar A2; Jathon Sapsford, Daiwa Scandal Creates
Fallout for Tokyo, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1995, at A16.
12. For an analysis of the legal aftermath of the BCCI affair, see BHAL.A, FoREIGN BANK
REGULATION, supra note 5. For an analysis of the market risk capital adequacy rules developed
in part in response to regulatory concerns over financial market volatility including the foreign
exchange rate crisis, see Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrirtm Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case Study
of Capital Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. loUIS U. L.J. 1 (1996). For a discussion of
possible legislative responses to the Daiwa scandal, including the requirement of external audits,
see John R. Wilke, Daiwa Scandal Sprm a Review of Banking Bill, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1995, at
A2; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Honse Comm. 011
Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig,
Comptroller of the Currency).
13. See, e.g., JAMES WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO PHYSIChL CHEMISTRY (8th ed. 1919) (discussing
the rriple point equilibrium of the three phases of water; e.g., gas, liquid, and solid states).
14. See, e.g., RAYMOND 1. MURRAY & GROVER C. COBB, PHYSICS: CONCEPTS AND CONSll-
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a reversible chemical reaction when the velocities in both directions
are equal. 15 Economists are also fluent with the concept. The neoclassical conception of an equilibrium is a state of balance among competing market forces in which there is neither excess demand for nor
excess supply of a good or service. 16
What practical value does an equilibrium theory of international
banking law have? It is difficult to anticipate all the possible future
uses to which this or any theory may be put. In general, two tests help
assess the potential value of a theory. First, is it possible to derive
logically from the theory some insights that were not obvious from the
assumptions underlying the theory? Second, does the theory offer a
means to apply empirical measurements and generate accurate predictions? The first test might be called the "Aha!" test. A person using
the theory reacts by saying: "Aha! Now the phenomenon I observe
makes sense," or "Aha! I did not conceptualize this phenomenon in
such an elegant, orderly manner before." The second test might be
called the "Wow!" test. A person using the theory says: "Wow! I did
not know the importance and magnitude of this phenomenon before,"
or "Wow! I did not know the repercussions of this phenomenon
before."
The equilibrium theory of international banking law developed in
this Article is designed with the "Aha!" and "Wow!" tests' in mind. It
aims to make two immediate contributions to international banking
law. First, it is a practical conceptual framework for the international
banking lawyer in New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore,
or any other international banking center to make sense of her professional environment. The framework transfOrms unstructured talk about
"chaos," "upheaval," and the like into careful consideration of equilibrium and its determinants. That is, the framework helps the lawyer
order her thinking about what appears to be utter chaos.
Second, the theory provides a systematic way for regulators to gauge
the likely effects of new rules on internationally active banks. Specifically, the theory helps guide the key institution responsible for
drafting international banking rules-the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, informally known as the Basle Supervisors Committee
(BSC)17-to evaluate prospectively the impact of its pronouncements.
(1970) (defining a static equilibrium as "the case where the system undergoes neither
translation nor rotation"').
15. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 392 (lOth ed. 1993).
16. Therefore, assuming the price mechanism operates freely, the marker for that good or
service will clear. The neoclassical economic concept of an equilibrium is discussed below. See
infra notes 110-130 and accompanying text.
17. The BSC was established in 197~ and was formally known as the "Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices."' It is usually referred to by irs informal name, "Basle
QUENCES
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The theory is a device for the BSC to predict the likely reactions of
banks to changes in existing rules and proposed new rules.
How is the equilibrium theory of international banking law developed in this Article? The theory is constructed by asking three questions. First, what is the definition of "equilibrium"? Second, what are
the determinants of a stable equilibrium? Third, what legal regimethat is, what set of existing and proposed rules on a particular topic
(e.g., capital adequacy) 1B-is most likely to be a stable equilibrium? 19
Committee." See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, IntrodiiCiory Note, 30 I.L.M. 967, 972 n.1 (1991). The
BSC is discussed infra notes 53-83 and accompanying text.
Of course, the BSC has rules and proposals for the capital adequacy treatment of many
transactions in addition to foreign exchange. See generally Frederick M. Struble & Norah Barger,
International Capital Standards for Banking Imtitllfiom, in I REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS
4-1-19 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner cds., 2d ed. 1995) (summarizing the July 1988 Basle
Accord credit risk capital adequacy requirements); NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK
SUPERVISORY STANDARDS supra note 2, at 193-212 (also summarizing the credit risk capital
requirements contained in the July 1988 Basle Accord); I GLOBAL RISK BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS, Charles A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds. (1994) (treating selected topics concerning the
BSC's capital adequacy regime); RAJ BHALA, PERSPECI"IVES ON R:ISK-BASED CAPITAL 43-102
(1989) (discussing the Basle Accord rules to safeguard against the risk of loss arising from credit
risks associated with a variety of on- and off-balance sheet banking transactions).
18. For the definition of capital adequacy, see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
19. The present effort is to be distinguished from my own earlier work in the capital adequacy
area, and that of some ocher scholars, in part on the basis of the breadth of the theoretical
perspective. These works tend to proceed immediately to the "raw data," i.e., the capital adequacy
,regime, with little development of a broad theoty. As a result, these worl:s critically analyze the
capital adequacy regime using a narrow set of criteria relevant to this regime, but arc not
necessarily helpful in assessing other international banking law regimes. See, e.g., Matthew
Elderfield, Baste Publishes Final Market Risk Capita/ Standards, 11 BUTTERWORTHS J. 1NT'L
BANKING & FIN. L. 125 (Mar. 1996) (evaluating the effect of the BSC's 1996 market risl:
amendment to the 1988 Basle Capital Accord on the European Union's capital adequacy directive); Walter I. Conroy, Note, Risk-Based Capital Adequary Guidelines: A Sotmd Regulatory Po/iry or
A Symptom if Regulatory Inadequary?, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2395 (1995) (considering whether
capital adequacy guidelines guarantee bank soundness); Hal S. Scott & Shinsaku Iwahara, In Search
of A Level Playing Field, GROUP OF THIRTY OCCASIONAL PAPER 46 1-4 (1994) and Hal S, Scott,
The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 885 (1995); (sizing up
the 1988 Basle Capital Accord based on the extent to which it levels the competitive playing
field among banks); Duncan E. Alford, Baste Committee International Capital Adeq11ary StandardJ:
Analysis and Implications for the Banking Indll!try, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 189, 209-20 (1992)
(considering specific effects on banks of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord such as encouraging asset
securitization and portfolio adjustments); Gallatin, Nothing to Lose But Their Chains, EUROMONEY
58 (Sept. 1992) (addressing distortions in bank lending and funding operations created by the
1988 Basle Capital Accord); William Taylor, Risk-Based Assessment of the Capital Adcq11ary of
Commercia/ Banks, in 1 CURRENT LEGAL IssUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 341-48 (Robert C.
Effros ed., 1992) (discussing international cooperation on bank capital adequacy issues); Peter C.
Hayward, Prospects for International Cooperation by Bank Supervisors, 24 INT'L LAw. 787 (1990)
(explaining the cooperation among G-10 bank regulators necessaty to reach the 1988 Basic
Capital Accord); BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON R:ISK-BASED CAPITAL, s11pra note 17, at xxvi-XJo."Viii,
12-15 (adopting a "building blocks" approach and exploring the substance-form distinction in
the context of credit risk rules for swaps); David T. Llewellyn, The Strategic Dilemma of \Vor/d
Banking, 4 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 504 (1989) (considering the effect of
the 1988 Basle Capital Accord on competitive neutrality, the cost of business services, and other
structural variables); Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequary StandardJ: A Legitimate Regtilatory
Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299 (1989) (assessing
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Parts II and III of this Article address the first question. Part II lays
out the starting point for equilibrium theory: the concept of law as
equilibrium developed initially by Professors Eskridge and Frickey to
critique Supreme Court decision-making. 20 Part II also makes two
minor adjustments to the Eskridge-Frickey approach. First, it identifies
the institutional players relevant to the international banking law
context and their respective principal interests: international banks and
making profits, the BSC and its future as a relevant plurilateral forum,
and domestic bank regulators and their concern for safety and soundness. Second, it gives an example of a legal regime whose stability
could be tested using equilibrium theory, namely, capital adequacy
requirements for foreign exchange transactions.
Part III addresses the problem of defining a stable equilibrium by
examining the applicability of neoclassical economic distinctions to
international banking law. It argues for a dynamic rather than static
concept of equilibrium, and indicates that either a partial or general
equilibrium analysis is appropriate. Part III posits that a legal regime
is likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium if banks would have no
reason to present significant opposition to that regime. Part III also
explores the strengths and limitations of this definition.
Part IV discusses the second issue and identifies the factors that
determine whether a legal regime is a stable dynamic equilibrium. Part
IV introduces and develops a new model-the FICAS model-to decide whether banks are likely to oppose a regime, and thus whether
the regime is stable-the FICAS model. This model has five determinants that affect stability: frequency of the adjustments to existing and
proposed rules in the regime; the intricacy of the rules and proposals;
the cogency of the rules and proposals; the authority of the rules and
proposals; and the scope of the rules and proposals. A hypothesized
relationship exists between each determinant and stability. The more
frequent the adjustments to rules in the regime, the more likely banks
will oppose the regime. The more intricate the rules, the more likely
the appropriateness of regulatory concern about capital adequacy); Joseph Jude Norton, The Work

of the Basle Supervisors Commiltee on Bank Capital Adeq111Jcy and the july 1988 Report on "International
Convergence of Capital Meas11rement and Capital Standards," 23

1NT'L LAw. 245 (1989) (discussing
the fearures of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord); William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision
and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO STATE L.J. 1365 (1989) (considering the relationship
becween the moral hazard problem and a risk-based capital scheme); Michael P. Malloy, U.S.
International Banking and the New Capital Adeq~~~Jcy Requirements: New, Old and Unexpected, 7 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 75 (1988) (treating key aspecrs of capiro! adequacy requiremenrs).
The present effort begins by developing a general conceprual framework in which to cricique
any incernacional banking law regime. In the derivative work based on this Article, the pacadigm
is applied to the capiral adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions. See Bhala, Applying
Eqrrilibrium Throry, supra note 12.
20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 27 (1994).
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banks will oppose the regime. The less cogent the rules, the more
likely banks will oppose the regime. The less authoritative the rules,
the more likely banks will oppose the regime. Finally, the narrower
the scope of application of the rules, the more likely banks will oppose
the regime.
Part V addresses the third issue, concerning the type of legal regime
that is most likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium. Using the
FICAS variables, Part V outlines the "ideal type" of regime, i.e., one
unlikely to give banks reason for significant, legitimate opposition. The
ideal type is self-regulation in which banks, not the BSC, play the
leading role in drafting roles and proposals.21 Part V explains why such
a self-regulatory regime minimizes bank opposition and, therefore, is
likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium. Finally, Part VI offers
concluding remarks. 22
II. THE STARTING POINT

For better or worse, since the collapse of the Bretton Woods international
monetary order, {currency} traders provide the only financial discipline the
world knows. They are financial vigilantes. Becartse governments co11ld not
provide financial law and order, traders took the law into their ()tlJn
hands. They sell protection at a price.
-Gregory J. Millrnan23
A. The Eskridge-Frickey Approach in Brief
A rare instance in which legal scholars devote attention to the
problem of equilibrium in the law is a welcome article by Professors
Eskridge and Frickey. 24 To be sure, they apply a concept to which
21. For the distinction between self-regulation and no regulation, sec infra note 206.
22. In a derivative article entitled Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case
Study of Capital Adequacy and Currency Trading, supra note 12, equilibrium theory and the FICAS
model are used to test the BSC's capital requirements for foreign exchange transactions. Thus,
the derivative article is a first effort at determining whether the theory and model are of practical
use in accordance with the "Aha!" and "Wow!" tests mentioned above. Using a partial equilibrium
analysis, the derivative article shows that until 1995, when the BSC issued an amended proposal
on market risk, the capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions was not n stable
dynamic equilibrium. There were several reasons for banks to oppose-and indeed they did
oppose--the regime. The derivative article, however, suggests that since 1995 the regime increasingly
appears to resemble the self-regulatory ideal and may, therefore, be headed for a stable dynamic
equilibrium. A broad implication of the derivative article is, therefore, chat the theory and model
may be put to practical use.
23. MilLMAN, supra note 8, at xiii.
24. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20. For an interesting consideration of the Eskridge·
Frickey approach to the problem of the retroactive application of rules, see Jill E. Fisch, Back to
the Future: Retroactivity and Legal Change 70-78 (Nov. 12, 1995) (unpublished manuscript
presented at William & Mary Law School faculry colloquium, on file with author. Revised version
forthcoming in HARV. L. REV. Mar. 1997).
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economists and physical scientists have devoted great thought. Still,
the work of Professors Eskridge and Frickey, coupled with the unstructured talk of upheaval, turmoil, and chaos by international banking
lawyers, is an inspiration to develop a rigorous theory of equilibrium
for international banking law. In order to analyze Supreme Court
decision-making, Professors Eskridge and Frickey posit a view of law
as an equilibrium that draws upon the Hart-Sacks legal process school.25
They attempt to transcend the familiar dialectic of legal formalismwhich exalts the rule of law-and legal realism-which holds that
rules result from judicial personal preferences.26
The Eskridge-Frickey approach focuses on the institutional context
of the evolution of public law. Institutions-namely, the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the Executive-are "rational, self-interested, interdependent, and affected by the sequence of institutional interaction."27 These institutions "engage in purposive behavior,''28 as each
institution strives to promote its own vision of the public interest by
acting in a strategic manner. When the institutions cooperate with and
compete against one another, the result is law. That is, law is "an
equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces or institutions.''29
This view contrasts sharply with legal formalism and legal realism.
Legal formalists consider law to be a dosed system of objective rules
discoverable through the application of deductive, analogical reasoning.30 Legal realists understand law to be the result of competing
centers of power that use legal reasoning to cloak the policy preferences
of the competitors.3 1 Professors Eskridge and Frickey consider law to
be an "equilibrium" which represents "a balance of competing institutional pressures."32 They add that this balance yields law superior to
law produced by a single institution.33 Each institution offers a special
expertise and represents a distinct constituency. Accordingly,· law re-

25. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE 11AKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey eds.,
1994).
26. Eskridge & Frickey, s11pra note 20, at 95.
27. Id. at 28; see also id. at 33.
28. Id.
29. ld.
30. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 68-69 (rev. ed.
1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 14-16, 58-61 (1990); LORD
LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 67980 (1985); EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 385-92 (rev. ed. 1974).
31. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher, !II et a!. eds., 1993); MURPHY &
COLEMAN, sfljlra note 30, at 33-36; LLOYD & FREEMAN, s11pra note 30, at 683-88; BODENHEIMER, s11pra note 30, at 124-33.
32. Eskridge & Frickey, s11pra note 20, at 32.
33. I d. at 3 5.
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suiting from institutional interaction is better informed and more
widely acceptable than that handed down by a single institution.
Further, over time, law that is an institutional equilibrium is adaptable
because parties objecting to outdated or otherwise inappropriate rules
"have multiple fora in which to press their petitions for change."3 4
An important question is when the equilibrium is stable: Professors
Eskridge and Frickey contend that "when no implementing institution
is able to interpose a new view without being overridden by another
institution," a stable equilibrium is attained.3 5 As a result of a familiar
sequential institutional interaction, they find that in the United States
constitutional system "[a]t any given time, most legal issues are in a
state of stable equilib~ium."36
Congress enacts statutes acceptable to the President, agencies
implement them through regulations and enforcement proceedings, the judiciary interprets the statutes and agency actions, and
Congress considers amending the statute to update it or to override errant interpretations. A consequence of this sequence is that
each institution has trumping power. The rule adopted by each
institution can be undone by the next institution to act.37
An interesting problem to which Professors Eskridge and Frickey
devote much of their attention concerns temporary displacements from
stable equilibria. They consider cases in which the Supreme Court
causes a displacement to occur (as a positive matter), and articulate
their views as to when the Court should displace a stable equilibrium
(as a normative matter).
For an international banking lawyer, the Eskridge-Frickey approach
raises challenging issues. For instance, a threshold question arises from
the fact that their approach is developed and applied in the context of
the Supreme Court's 1993 Term. This context is antiseptic. A central
fact of an international banking lawyer's professional life is chat her
context is cross-border in nature. Consider the foreign exchange market-the global currency bazaar. The players never sleep (i.e., the
bazaar is never really closed), and more importantly, the players are
from starkly different legal backgrounds--civil, common, Islamic, and
emerging legal cultures.
34. Id.
35. Id. This contention seems analogous to a Pareto-style notion of efficiency in which no
patty can be made better off without making some other party worse off. The contention also
might be thought of as "process efficiency."
36. Id. at 29.
37. Id. at 30.
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A second central fact of the international banking lawyer's professional existence is the relentless onslaught of new technology. For
instance, the foreign exchange market incorporates electronic technology that subverts (intentionally or not) widespread canons such as the
need for a contract to be written in order to be enforceable.3 8 Given
these facts, the international banking lawyer is sure to wonder whether
the Eskridge-Frickey approach can lend any useful insights to her
profession.
Unless this approach is modified, her doubt is reasonable. Fortunately, the approach can be adjusted and refined to yield a theory which
in turn sharpens her perception of "chaos" in international banking
law. The Eskridge-Frickey approach can be re-worked to change the
context from United States constitutional law to international banking
law. Specifically, the relevant institutional players in international banking
law and their interests can be highlighted. It is also helpful to give an
example of a legal regime. Thereafter, it becomes possible to address
squarely the questions of defining equilibrium in the new context,
identifying its determinants, and positing an ideal-type regime.
B. Changing the Context

In the constitutional law context, the important institutions are
domestic. In international banking law, the players operate at global,
multilateral, and domestic levels. There are three key players: banks,
which know no boundaries; the BSC, which consists of representatives
from a sub~et of nations; and domestic bank regulators in individual
countries. While each player has a range of institutional interests, its
behavior typically is dominated by one interest: for banks, profits; for
the BSC, institutional relevance; and for domestic regulators, safety and
soundness.
1. Banks and Profit
A formidable force in international banking is the private sector-a
force largely unaccounted for in the Eskridge-Frickey approach. Banks
are the only institutional players that are truly global: while the BSC
is a multilateral institution and bank regulators operate at the domestic
level, banks are from every country and do not concern themselves with
geopolitical boundaries, except to the extent these hamper their transactions. Consider the foreign exchange market: London, New York, and
Tokyo are the leading trading centers, yet significant trading activity
38. See Raj Bhala, Self-Regulation in Global Electronic Markets Thrortgh Reinvigorated Trade Usages,
31 IDAHO L REV. 863 (1995) and Raj Bhala, A Pragmatic Strategy for the Scope of Sales Law, the
Stat11te of Fra11ds, and the Global Currency Bazaar, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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occurs in Singapore, Hong Kong, Sydney, Geneva, Frankfurt, and
Paris.39 There is almost no technological barrier to participating in the
foreign exchange market from any point on the globe. In fact, well
over half of all over-the-counter ("OTC") foreign exchange transactions
are cross-border in nature.40
'
The generic term "banks" is somewhat misleading. In fact, there are
two broad classes of private sector players in the foreign exchange
market: commercial banks and securities firms. 41 The distinction is
relevant because, as discussed below, the former, but not the latter, are
addressees of the BSC's pronouncements.42 Nonetheless, the term "banks"
(or, sometimes, "international banks") is used in BSC publications
without any definition.43 For present purposes, "bank" may be understood to mean a commercial bank that is actively engaged in crossborder transactions and is an addressee of the BSC's existing and
proposed legal requirements. The transactions by these banks include
not only foreign exchange, but also short-term Eurocurrency placements, syndicated lending, issuing letters of credit, and even classic
securities activities like underwriting and portfolio management.44 The
BSC's requirements cover topics such as capital adequacy, comprehensive consolidated supervision, and disclosure of information. 45
For example, foreign exchange market transactions include spots,
forwards, currency options, and currency swaps, all of which are offbalance sheet activities.46 What motivation lies behind these transac39. MONETARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF FORiliGN ExCHANGE MARKET ACTIVITY IN APRIL 1992 2,
13-16 (Mar. 1993) {hereinafter CENTRAL BANK SURVEY].
40. CEN1RAL BANK SuR~Y, supra note 39, at 2, 12-13.
41. Brokers constitute a third class. While the bulk of foreign exchange transactions are carried
out directly between dealing banks or securities firms, about one-third of foreign exchange
transactions in the leading trading centers involve brokers. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note
39, at 1, 11-12, 23-24.
42. See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text. Put differently, commercial banks, but
not securities firms, are within the scope of the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of
municipal bank regulators. Securities firms are, of course, subject to regulation by domestic
securities regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or the U.K. Securities
and Investments Board.
43. See, e.g., Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, lntematio11al
Convergmce of Capital Measuremmt and Capital StandardJ, 30 INT'L L. M. 980 (1991) (informally
known as the 1988 Basle Capital Accord).
44. See, e.g., TAEHO KIM, INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND BANKING (1993) (discussing international banking transactions).
45. With respect to capital adequacy, see Bhala, App/yi11g Equilibrium Theory, Jflpra note 12,
and the sources cited supra notes 17-19. With respect to comprehensive consolidated supervision
and informacion disclosure, see BHALA, FoREIGN BANK REGULATION, supra note 5, at 105-41,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING-S1RENGTHENING THE FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISING INTERNATIONAL BANKS (Mar. 1994), and Duncan E. Alford, Bas/e
Committee Minimum StandardJ: lntematioMI Regttlatory Response to the Failure of BCCl, 26 Gno.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241 (1992).
46. That is, they do not involve booking assets or liabilities. For an explanation of these
transactions, see Bhala, Risk Trade-Offi, supra note 3.
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tions? Banks seek to make money, or to hedge risks so as to avoid
losing moneyY
Like bounty hunters in the Old West, the [currency} traders
enforce the economic law, not for love of law, but for profit. They
have only one goal-making money. No political ideals or immaterial [sic} values can ever distract them from this goal. When the
governments of Europe decided to implement a common monetary policy, they had a long-term program in mind to overcome
centuries of division by establishing a historic union. Traders
didn't care about that dream. For several years during the 1980s,
the European monetary system was a profitable trading opportunity. Then in 1992, European governments showed by small words
and acts that they might not be quite as committed to · the
program of unity as they originally said they were. Traders immediately reversed course, sold off some European currencies, bought
others, and in the process demolished the European monetary
system. Some European officials saw in the activities of the traders
evidence of a conspiracy to wreck European unity. But that view
gives traders credit for being more broad minded than they are.
If European unity had continued to be a profitable project, the
traders would certainly have supported it.48
There is no single formula for profiting from these or any other type
of transaction. Different banks may employ different long- or shortterm strategies, cost reduction strategies, or hedging strategies .
. For example, banks may pursue a long-term investment strategy and
take a long or short position in a particular currency or derivative
product, like an option, with the belief that the value of the position
will increase.49 At some future date, long positions can be sold, and
47. See, e.g., Joseph S. Rizzello, The Development and Evolution of DerivatitJe Products, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES & SYNTHETICS 1-8 (Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman eds., 1994);
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES-ACI"IONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 25-29 (May 1994); lNST. OF lNT"L FIN., AN INTEGRATED BANK REGULATORY APPROACH TO DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES 2-4 (May 1993). The discussion herein assumes
that banks act as dealers, i.e., they seek profits for their own trading accounts. Alternatively, they
may act as an agent for a customer, in which case they will obtain a fee for their services. For
discussions of how to enhance risk management controls associated with derivatives activities, see
DERIVATIVES POLICY GROUP, FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTARY OVERSIGHT (Mar. 1995); GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra; GROUP OF THIRTY GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES (July 1993).
48. MILLMAN, supra note 8, at xiii.
49. A "long" position means the bank buys and holds an asset. A "short" position means the
bank sells an asset that it does not own but later covers that position by purchasing the asset
and delivering it to the buyer.
While there is some debate about the meaning of the term "derivatives,"" it is commonly
understood to encompass "financial instruments which derive their value from the performance
of assets, interest or currency exchange rates, or indexes." Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Banking Circular 277, Risk Management of Financial Derivatives 4 (1993), reprinted in
Safety and Soundness Issues Related to Bank Derivatives Activities-Part I, Hearing before the HoiiSe
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short posltlons can be covered profitably. Alternatively, banks may
make money by adopting a short-term speculative strategy, seeking to
profit by betting against anticipated market movements. These investment and speculative strategies may be used in trading spots, forwards,
and options. Banks may use currency swaps to reduce funding costs
and, thereby, increase profits. Finally, banks may use forwards, options,
and swaps to hedge a risk they bear because of some other transaction
in which they have engaged. 50 Such risks could arise from financial
operations (e.g., funding or portfolio investment decisions) or international trade (i.e., the cross-border movement of goods). While hedging
entails a cost (e.g., payment of an option premium), it may help avoid
losses resulting from excessive risk exposure. In sum, while the banks
use a variety of means, their end goal of profits remains uniform. 51
It is important to qualifY this point: the pursuit of profit is complemented by a good reputation. As discussed below, most banks value
a reputation for integrity.52 In most international financial markets, the
banks are repeat players. Behaving opportunistically or in an unsafe
and unsound manner may maximize short-term gains, but it is sure to
harm a bank's long-term pursuit of profits because its pool of potential
counterparties will dry up.
2. The BSC and Institutional Relevance
The BSC meets periodically at the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") in Basle, Switzerland, though there is no formal legal
relationship between the BSC and BIS. 53 After 1971, when the Bretton
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 688 (Oct. 28, 1993).
Accordingly, there is no need to actually buy the underlying asset, interest rote or currency
instrument, or index. See also Rizzello, supra note 47, at 2-3; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 47, at 3, 24. For instance, currency options and currency
swaps are examples of derivatives in that their value depends in part on an exchange rote for an
underlying pair of currencies. In addition, forwards are sometimes classified as derhatives. See
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular 277, st~pra, at 4; GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DEIUVATIVES, supra note 47, at 26-27.
50. Hedging is a highly complex business beyond the scope of this Article. For a brief
discussion, see Bhala, Risk Trade-0/ft, supra note 3, at 43-48.
51. To be sure, different banks could have different secondary goals that serve their primary
profit-making interest. For example, a larger bank (as measured by profits, assets, or market share)
active in the foreign exchange market might try to obtain advantages over a smaller bank in the
form of favoroble rules or proposals. In proctice, however, the broad membership of leading bank
associations such as the International Swap Dealers Association and British Bankers Association,
discussed below, suggests a remarkable degree of consonance among banks. See infra notes 82-83
and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text. See generally LEON E. ThAKMAN, Ttm LAW
MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMEROAL LAw 39 (1983) (noting the necessity for a troder
to preserve its reputation for reliability and morolity, and discussing the appropriateness of
self-regulation).
53. See B"SLE CoMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PREFACE TO CONSULTATIVE PROPOSAL,
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Woods fixed-exchange rate system broke down, the BIS provided the
forum for finance ministers to gather and discuss international monetary matters. Since then, the BIS has played the same role for central
bankers from the G-10 countries-Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United Statesplus Switzerland and Luxembourg. As a result, the BSC consists of
representatives from the central banks and bank regulators of the G-1 0
countries. In essence, the BSC is an informal forum for major industrial
and financial countries to share views on significant international banking issues.
It is inappropriate to accord the BSC the status of a "multilateral"
body because it is noticeably dissimilar from a truly multilateral body
like the World Trade Organization (WT0).5 4 Rather, the BSC is composed of a subset of the world's bank regulators; it excludes, for
example, most of the central banks of the less developed and newly
industrialized countries.55 As a matter of public international law, this
plurilateral body lacks any pres!=riptive, adjudicatory, or enforcement
jurisdiction over banks.56 That is, the BSC has no authority to write
banking law for the G-10 countries, to resolve disputes among G-10
governments or private parties, or to enforce banking laws in G-10
countries. 57
As a result, the BSC operates on a tenuous foundation. It is highly
unlikely that the G-10 countries will confer jurisdictional authority
upon the BSC. Allowing the BSC to write banking law would threaten
THE PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF NETI1NG, MARKET RISKS AND INTEREST RATE RISK 1, n.1
(Apr. 1993).
54. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in Uruguay Round Trade Agrn..
ment, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 659 (1994).
55. See generally BHALI., FOREIGN BANK REGULATION, supra note 5, at 116-19 (discussing the
development of an exclusive "club" of banking regulators from major countries).
56. These three types of jurisdictions are distinguished as follows:
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status
of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order,
by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court;
(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the process of its courts or
administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is
a party to the proceedings;
(c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., to induce or compel compliance or to punish noncompliance
with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative,
police, or ocher nonjudicial action. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF
THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987). See generally J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 222-316
(1963) (discussing the different bases for jurisdiction).
57. The BSC is not a "state," hence§§ 402, 421, and 431 of RESTATEMENT, supra note 56,
which lay out the bases for prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction, respectively,
are inapplicable. A "state'' is "an entiry that has a defined territory and a permanent population,
under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capaciry to engage in,
formal relations with ocher such entities." RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 201.

16

Harvard International Law ]o11rnal I Vol. 38

each country's sovereignty. The United States experience with the
recently completed Uruguay Round is instructive. Many members of
Congress feared that the WTO might be able to compel the United
States to alter an international trade rule determined by a WTO
dispute resolution panel to be inconsistent with the Uruguay Round
agreements. To address this concern, Congress inserted in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act a supremacy clause: in the event of an inconsistency between United States law and a provision in a Uruguay
Round agreement, the former takes precedence over the latter. 58 Moreover, Senator Robert Dole and the White House exchanged a letter
agreement stating that if WTO dispute resolution panels rule against
the United States three times in five years, then the panel decisions
will be reviewed by a group of United States judges, and the United
States could consider withdrawing from the WTQ.59
The sovereignty concern is more pronounced in the international
banking than the international trade context. As a result of the existence of a "constitution" for international trade-the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-and eight rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations since 1947, international trade law is well developed and
increasingly harmonized. 60 In contrast, banking structures tend to vary
significantly across countries. These different countries support different domestic legal regimes on many issues, most notably rules regarding the scope of permissible banking activities. 61 No doubt the United
States would be unwilling to cede sovereign authority to the BSC,
which might impose rules wholly inapposite in the United States
banking context. Indeed, "[m]embers of the Basel Committee still

58. Section 102(a)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act states that "[n]o provision of
any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person
or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect." Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (1994). See a/so RAJ BHAU, 1NTERNhTIONAL
ThhDE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS cbs. 2, 4 (1996).
59. See BHAU, INTERNATIONAL ThhoE UW, supra note 58, ch. 2.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., GENERhL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK REGULhTORY STRUCTURE: CANhDh 1213, 18-19 (Sept. 1995) (noting non-bank activities of Canadian banks); GENERhL AcCOUNTING
OFFICE, BANK REGULhTORY STRUCTURE: FRANCE 2, 12-15 (Aug. 1995) (noting France's universal banking system); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK REGULhTORY STRUCTURE: THE
UNITED KINGDOM 16 (Dec. 1994) (noting U.K. banks conduct securities activities either in a
subsidiary or in the bank itself); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK REGULhTORY STRUC•
TURE: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 10-11 (May 1994) (discussing Germany's universal
banking system); Symposium, Global Trends TliWard Universal Banking, 19 BROOK J. INT'L L.
1-129 (1993) (discussing international banking practices, including permissible non-banking
activities in different countries); Charles M. Horn, The Legal Barrier Between U.S. Investment and
COillmercia/ Banking: Its Origim, Application, and Prospects, in 1 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES APPt:CTING
CENTRAL BANKS, supra note 19, at 279-310 (discussing the Glass-Steagall Act); NtCHOLhS A.
LASH, BANKING Lhws AND REGULhTIONS 126-41 (1987) (discussing non-banking activities of
U.S. banks).
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experience impediments in simply sharing information," as the BCCI
and Daiwa cases amply illustrate. 62
Given this "sovereignty limit" on the BSC's jurisdiction, what selfinterest does the BSC promote? At bottom, it seeks continued relevance, i.e., to retain its status as a highly regarded forum for central
bankers. This characterization is a legal process conception of the
BSC:6 3 the BSC wants to "preserve the integrity of its institutional
character."64 The extent to which the BSC's institutional relevance goal
is met can be measured by the extent to which it produces influential
legal recommendations. The BSC attempts to achieve its interest by
publishing rules and proposals designed for implementation in G-10
countries, and possibly also in other countries.6 5
The BSC's success in this regard is evidenced by the elaborate capital
adequacy regime it has produced.66 In general, a legal regime in
international banking may be defined as a set of existing and proposed
rules on a discrete topic. The BSC's capital adequacy regime is, therefore, a set of rules and proposals on the amount of capital a bank must
maintain to cushion against losses from credit and market risks. 67

62. RICHARD ]. HERRING & ROBERT E. LiTAN, FINANC!hL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 136 (1995). Regarding the BCCI affair, see BHALh, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION,
s11pra note 5, at 130-35 (discussing the failure of the Bank of England to share information with
the Federal Reserve). With respect to the Daiwa scandal, see the sources cited s11pra note 11.
63. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF lAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994). For discussions of the legal process concepcion of the Supreme Court, see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adj11diration, 92 HhRV. L. REV. 353, 365-72 (1978); and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Nelltral
Principles of Constit11tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1959).
64. See Eskridge & Frickey, s11pra note 20, at 34.
65. See, e.g., NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS, srtpra noce
2, at 175-201 (discussing the origins and work of the Basle Committee and highlighting irs
effortS in the area of capital adequacy); RICHARD ]. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL
REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 8-9 (1995) (noting the existence of arbitrary and
complicated facers in the Basle Committee's work on capital adequacy and arguing the Committee
"should return co irs original role of serving as an information clearinghouse and forum in which
regulators from different countries can exchange views about how co measure and control various
sorts of risks"); id. at 98-113 (covering the history of international bank supervision coordinated
by the Basle Committee); id. at 132-37 (arguing that the Basle Committee should focus on irs
role as a forum for exchanging views about measuring and controlling risks); CJ. Thompson, The
Basle Concordat: International Collaboration in Banking S11pervision, in 1 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 331-32 (Robert C. Effros ed.) (observing that the Basle Committee
"was esrablished to provide a forum for regular confidential discussion on the handling of specific
problems"); Charles Freeland, The Work of the Baste Committee, in 2 CURRENT LEGAL IssuES
AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 231-40 (Robert C. Effros ed.) (reviewing the history and work of
rhe Basle Committee).
66. See s11pra noces 17-19. For an argument that the capiral adequacy regime has "worked"
despite international financial crises, see Echan B. Kapscein, Shockproof, 75 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.Feb. 1996, at 2. My skepticism of Kapscein's argument is discussed in David Murch, 20 Years of
Hard Work Ease Impact of Financial Fiascos, CHRISTIAN Scr. MONITOR, Mac. 1, 1996, at 8.
67. "Credit risk" is che risk of councerpaccy failure, i.e., the risk a bank's councerparty will
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These risks are associated with on-balance sheet transactions (e.g.,
conventional loans) and off-balance sheet transactions (e.g., foreign
exchange spots, forwards, options, and swaps). Additionally, the regime
covers matters relating to netting and the measurement of interest rate
risk. 68 This regime is taken seriously by G-10 countries. For instance,
the 1988 Basle Accord (hereinafter, the "Accord") has been implemented in the municipal law of the G-10 countries and many countries
outside of the G-10 group. 69 In the United States, the Accord has been
implemented through federal regulations. 70 In addition, federal bank
regulators have issued the BSC's post-Accord publications as proposed
federal regulations.7 1
'not fulfill its obligations to the bank. See International Convergence of Capital Mcas11rcment atrd Capital
Standards, srtpra note 43, at 988-89, ~~ 8, II.31. "Marker risk" is defined 111pra note 23.
The BSC's capiral adequacy regime is not the only sec of rules and proposals on capital
requirements. In January 1996, the European Union's Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD), which
applies co European banks and investment firms, took effect. Council Directive 93/6/ EEC of
15th March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions. 1993 O.J.
(L 141) 1. For a discussion of the CAD, see Matthew Elderfield, Dmlopmcnts in EC and
International Capital Adeq11acy Reg11lations, 2]. FIN. REG. & CoMPUANCE 314 (1994).
68. "Netting" refers to any technique used to calculate a net (as distinct from gross) position
by offsetting positions associated with a series of transactions. See 1988 Basle Capital Accord,
supra note 43, Annex 3, 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1006. For example, a bank may be obligated
to deliver a given currency on a particular date. Through a technique known as "bilateral nettins
by novation," chis obligation is amalgamated with all ocher obligations for the same currency
and value dare, thereby substituting a single net amount for the previous gross obligations. /d.
at n.6. "Interest rate risk" is the "the risk that changes in market interest rates might adversely
affect an institution's financial condition." Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "Measurement of Banks' Exposure to Interest Rate Risk," Annex 3, at 33 (Apr. 1993).
69. The Accord took full effect at the end of 1992. See Basle Capital Accord, s11pra note 43,
at 996, ~ 49.
70. For example, in the U.S., the Federal Reserve's implementing regulations arc found at 12
C.RR. pts. 208 app. A (for scare member banks) and 225 app. A (for bank holding companies)
(1996). The Federal Reserve's risk-based capital regulations supplement, nor supplant, its traditional regulations concerning minimum primary capital-co-assets and total capital-to-assets ratios.
See MiCHAEL P. MAlloY, BANKING LAw AND REGULATION § 5.3.3.4 at 5.90-.117 (rei, Dec.
1995). The traditional regulations are not relevant co chis Article.
The other U.S. federal bank regulators have issued similar regulations. See 12 C.RR. pes. 3
app. A (risk-based capital regulations of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for
national banks) and 325, app. A (risk-based capital regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIQ for insured state non-member banks) (1996). For a comparative analysis of
the Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC regulations, see BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES REGARDING DIFFERENCES IN
CAPITAL AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AMONG THE FEDERAL BANKING AND THRIFT AGENCIES
(Jan. 9, 1995), reprinted in 60 Fed. Reg. 3227 (1995).
With respect co the implementation of the Basle Accord in non-G-10 countries, see NORTON,
DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS, Sllpra note 2, at 229-33, 239.
71. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Press Release on Risk-Based Capital Standards; Market Risk; and
Internal Models Backtesting (Mar. 7, 1996) (proposing co implement the BSC's January 1996
capiral adequacy rules on marker risk); Federal Reserve Press Release on Risk-Based Capital
Standards: Derivative Transactions (Aug. 29, 1995) (issuing a final rule to implement the BSC's
April 1995 rule on the recognition of bilateral netting arrangements); Federal Reserve Press
Release on Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk (July 14, 1995) (proposing to implement
the BSC's April 1995 proposed capital adequacy rules on marker risk); Federal Reserve Press
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Interestingly, the frequency with which the BSC created and modified
its capital adequacy regime may help explain why an international
banking lawyer finds her field chaotic. The BSC developed its capital
adequacy regime between 1988-96 by publishing the following eight
documents: 72
(1) The 1988 Baste Accord.7 3 A report setting forth capital rules for
credit risk.74
(2) The 1993 Market Risk Proposal.7 5 A "consultative proposal" to
amend the 1988 Accord by requiring ·an express capital charge for
market risk.
(3) The 1993 Netting Proposal.76 A "consultative proposal" to amend
the 1988 Accord to recognize certain netting techniques.
(4) The 1993 Interest Rate Risk ProposalJ7 A "consultative proposal"
to amend the 1988 Accord to measure interest rate risk.·
(5) The 1994 Netting Amendment.78 An amendment to the· 1988
Accord to recognize certain netting techniques.
(6) The 1995 Netting Amendment.79 A second amendment to the
1988 Accord to recognize certain netting techniques.

Release on Capital and Capital Adequacy Guidelines (Dec. 2, 1994) (implementing the BSC's
July 1994 rules on the recognition of bilatetal netting arrangements); Fedetal Reserve Press
Release on Capital and Capital Adequacy Guidelines (Aug. 22, 1994) (proposing to implement
the BSC's July 1994 rules on the recognition of bilatetal netting arrangements).
72. All documents listed below are on file with the author and may be obtained from the
Bank for International Settlements, Postfach, CH-4002, Basle, Switzerland.
The BSC's economic and financial studies are sent to persons on its mailing list. One of the
frustrations associated with research in international banking law, however, is the difficulty in
obtaining the BSC's legal documents. Few appear on Lexis or in International Legal Materials,
and if they are so published it is only after great delay. The best way to obtain a document is
through personal contacts. The BSC ought to follow the example of the World Trade Organization
and ensure that the results of its legal work are widely disseminated and easily accessible. One
step would be to include the BSC's legal documents on the mailing list, and expand the addressees
to cover legal data bases and law libraries. This step would be consistent with the BSC's interest
of promoting itself as a pre-eminent international banking law forum.
73. See supra note 43. The "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards" is informally known as the "1988 Basle Accord."
74. "Credit risk" is the risk that a bank's counterparty will default on its obligations to the
bank. See 1988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 43, at 982, , 8.
75. This document is formally entitled "The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks" (Apr.
1993). It is prefaced by "The Prudential Supervision of Netting, Market Risks and Interest Rate
Risk" (Apr. 1993).
76. This document is formally entitled "The Supervisory Recognition of Netting for Capital
Adequacy Purposes" (Apr. 1993).
77. See supra note 68.
78. This document is formally entitled "The Capital Adequacy Treatment of the Credit Risk
Associated with Certain Off-Balance Sheet Items" (July 1994). It is prefaced by a July 15, 1994
press statement.
79. This document is formally entitled "Basle Capital Accord: Treatment of Potential Exposure
for Off-Balance Sheet Items" (Apr. 1995).

20

Harvard International Law }ot~rnal I Vol. 38

(]) The 1995 Market Risk Proposa/.80 A "consultative proposal," which
supersedes the 1993 Market Risk Proposal, to amend the 1988 Accord
by requiring an express capital charge for market risk.
(8) The 1996 Market Risk Amendment. 81 An amendment to the 1988
Basle Accord to cover capital rules on market risk, which confirms the
proposed amendment in the 1995 Market Risk Proposal.
Even for the seasoned practitioner (or scholar), each one of these
documents is extraordinarily complex, another reason she complains of
upheaval. Nevertheless, she must pay a great deal of attention to each
document and offer comments to the BSC (or relevant domestic bank
regulator). These comments serve to exert pressure on the BSC to
further modify its existing or proposed rules. For example, in 1993
three major banking groups, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA''), the British Bankers' Association ("BBA"), and
the Institute of International Finance ("IIF"), published lengthy critiques of the BSC's consultative papers.82 These critiques effectively
forced the BSC to issue a revised consultative paper in 1995, which in
turn was the subject of another round of comments from banks.8 3 The
BSC again responded to the banks' criticisms by issuing its 1996
Market Risk Amendment.

80. This document is formally entitled "Planned Supplement to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks" (Apr. 1995). It is prefaced by a press release dated April 13, 1995 and a
summary document entitled "Proposal to Issue a Supplement to the Basle Capital Accord to
Cover Market Risks." It is followed by a commentary entitled "An Internal Model-Based Approach
to Market Risk Capital Requirements."
81. This document is formally entitled "Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate
Market Risks" (Jan. 1996). It is prefaced by a Dec. 12, 1995 press statement, a Dec. 12, 1995
communique, and a summary document entitled "Overview of the Amendment to the Capital
Accord to Incorporate Market Risks" (Jan. 1996). The Amendment is followed by a paper entitled
"Supervisory Framework for the Use of 'Backtesting' in Conjunction with the Internal Models
Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements" (Jan. 1996).
82. See Letter from Joseph Bauman, Chairman, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., to Basle Committee on Banking Supervision re: Consultative Proposal by the Basic
Committee: Capiral Adequacy for Market Risk (Dec. 28, 1993) (on file with author); British
Bankers' Association, The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks (Oct. 1993) (on file with
author); Institute of International Finance, Report of the Working Group on Capital Adequacy
(Oct. 1993) (on file with author); Institute of International Finance, An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach to Derivatives Activities (May 1993) (on file with author). The three groups
represent a very substantial number of banks active in the foreign exchange market.
83. See, e.g., Letter from David H. Sidwell, Managing Director and Controller, J.P. Morgan,
to William W. Wiles, Secrerary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System re: Basic
Committee Proposal on the Supervisory Treatment of Markee Risks (Aug. 2, 1995) (with attachments) (on file with author); Letter from Gay H. Evans, Chairman, International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, to Basle Committee on Banking Supervision re: Planned Supplement to
the Capiral Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (July 31, 1995) (on file with author). In addition,
the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissioners offered
comments on the 1995 Market Risk Proposal. See Technical Committee, IOSCO, "Implications
for Securities Regulators of the Increased Use of Value at Risk Models by Securities Firms" (July
1995) (on file with author).
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3. Domestic Bank Regulators and Safety and Soundness
Aside from their participation in the BSC, bank regulators such as
the Federal Reserve operate at the domestic level.84 At this level, their
role is to promulgate and enforce regulations, that ens!Ife the safety and
soundness of their respective banking systems. Indeed, safety and soundness is "[t]he central concept of banking regulation." 85 Operationally,
this concept is integrally linked to capital adequacy rules. Indeed, it
may be argued that the capital adequacy regime is the single most
important set of rules and proposals in both international and domestic
banking law.
"Financial system soundness and stability are strengthened by ensuring that banks have adequate capital cushions to support the risks
they undertake . . . ."86 Thus, since the mid-1980s regulators have
taken an increasingly "capital intensive" approach to safety and soundness.87 Various arguments have been put forth to account for this
84. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, the term "Federal Reserve" refers to the Board of
Governors and the 12 Federal Reserve banks.
85. MAllOY, supra note 70, § 5.3.1, at 5.54. For a discussion of the meaning of this concept,
see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, FidiiCiary Duties' Demanding Co111in: Bank Director Liability for Umafe
or Umound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L REV. 175, 187-202 (1995).
86. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONJ\L FINANCE, REPORT, supra note 82, at 1. See also INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONJ\L FINANCE, AN INTEGRATED BANK REGULATORY APPROACH, supra note 47,
at 5.
87. MAllOY, supra note 70, § 5.3.1, at 5.53--.54. For example, after a brief transition period
(1988-1992), the Basle Accord took effect in the U.S. and other G-10 countries at the end of
1992. 1988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 43, at 995-96, ~~ 45-50. In the U.S., at least,
implementation of the Accord was hardly the end of the regulators' interest on the link berween
safety and soundness and capiral adequacy. First, the Federal Reserve followed up on the BSC's
1993--1996 proposals with its own proposed regulations. See supra note 71.
Second, just one year after the Accord, in 1989 Congress passed the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), Pub. L 101-73, § 1001, 103 Stat. 183
(1989) (codified, inter alia, at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). For general discussions of FIRREA,
see Daniel B. Gail & Joseph ]. Norton, A Decade's journey from "Deregulation" to "Supervisory
Regulation": The Finandal lmtitutiom Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW.
1103 (1990); Daniel B. Gail & Joseph]. Norton, The Finandal Imtitutiom Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989: Dealing with the Regulators, 107 BANKING L.J. 196 (1990); Michael P.
Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal
Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117 (1989). This statute mandated an inter-agency study on
ways to improve the safety and competitiveness of the U.S. banking system. 12 U.S.C. § 1811,
§ 1002(b). The result, known as the "Treasury Modernization Study," called capital "[t]he single
most powerful tool to make banks safer" and faulted bank regulators for "not adequately
focus[ing) on the crucial importance of capiral." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MOD·
ERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE CoMPETITIVE BANKS
(1991), reprinted in Fed. Banking L Rep. (CCH) No. 1377, Part II (Feb. 14, 1991) at 29,
[hereinafter Treasury Modernization Study (small caps)]. After all, capital is "an 'up-front' cushion
to absorb losses ahead of the taxpayer, and banks are less likely to rake excessive risk when they
have substantial amountS of their own money at stake." TREASURY MoDERNIZATION STUDY, supra
at 29. See also, BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON R.ISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 17, at 25-29, 43-44.
The Study called not for an increase in capital ratios, but instead a "strengthening" of the role
that capiral plays in bank regulation. TREASURY MODERNIZATION STUDY, supra, at 29. A key
recommendation was that regulators should develop capiral guidelines to account for interest rate
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reorientation. One argument is that the origins of the 1988 Basle Accord
lie in the Third World debt crisis of the early to mid-1980s.88 A
different argument is that the Accord's origins lie in domestic p~litics.B9
Whatever the correct explanation, there is no doubt that the interest
of bank regulators in promoting safety and soundness through capital
adequacy requirements influences the BSC. To the extent the BSC
wants to maintain its institutional relevance, it must be sensitive to
the interest of its members.9° Accordingly, it is not surprising that the
BSC devoted so much attention to capital adequacy from 1988 to
1996, and that one of the stated goals of the 1988 Accord is to
"strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking
system."9 1

risk associated with a bank's activities because the extant regulations at the time, based on the
Basle Accord, deale only with credit risk. Absent the inclusion of interest-race risk factors in a
risk-based capical ratio, a bank might attempt co satisfy the ratio by replacing high-credit risk
assets with high interest-rate risk assets. TREASURY MODERNIZATION STUDY, snpra, at 33. As
mentioned above, one of the proposals discussed by bank regulators at the BSC in 1993 addresses
chis concern.
Third, in 1991 Congress enacted the Fedecal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.). It links expressly the "safety and soundness" concept with capital adequacy. The
FDICIA requires regulators co cake "prompt corrective action" so as co resolve problems at a bank
in a manner chat minimizes the long-term cost co the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
insurance fund. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(aX1)-(2). Pcompc corrective action can include implementing
tighter capital rules for a problem bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)-(t), (h)-(i), (k), (n). The FDICIA
also authorizes bank regulators co impose more stringent capital requirements on banks chat the
regulators determine are in an unsafe and unsound condition or are engaged in an unsafe and
unsound practice. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(g); MALLoY, snpra note 70, § 1.4.5 at 1.126, § 3.6 at
3.104, § 5.3.1 at 5.47. Pursuant co the FDICIA, the Federal Reserve (nnd ocher federal bank
regulatory agencies) has promulgated regulations defining what "safety and soundness" means in
terms of operational and managerial srandards, asset quality, earnings, stock valuation standards,
and compensation systems. 12 U.S.C. § 1831s; 12 C.P.R. pes. 208, 225, 263, 303, 308, 364;
MALLoY, snpra note 70, § 1.4.5 at 1.126, § 3.6 at 3.104, § 5.3.1 at 5.47.
88. See, e.g., MILLMAN, ThE VANDALS' CROWN, Slpra note 8, at 144; U.N. CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL BANKS AND THE EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 1-14, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/22 (1992). Indeed, the statutory
authority for the U.S. co participate in the development of international bank capital standards
lies in the International Lending Supervision Ace of 1983 ("ILSA") which was enacted in pare in
response co the debe crisis. Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. IX, 908, 97 Stat. 1278, 1280 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 3901 (1983)). See 129 CoNG. REC. pt. 2, 2320-23 (1983) (statement of Sen. Heinz
observing that "more chan twice the capital of the nine largest U.S. banks is committed co the
less developed world"). Banks were dangerously over-exposed co poor credit risks as n result of
loans co governments and parascacal companies. The risk-based capital scheme developed by the
BSC was a regulatory effort co compel banks co better manage their credit risk exposures.
89. See ETHAN B. .K!.PSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 103-11 (1994) (arguing
that the demand for incernacional convergence of bank capital standards grew out of domestic
political concerns in the United States); Ethan B. Kapstein, Snpervising International Bank.J: Origins
and Implications of the Bas/e AccfJfd, in I GLOBAL RISK BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS 3-3 7 (Charles
A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds., 1994) (making the same argument).
90. Indeed, it is fair to say that the small permanent scaff of the BIS has internalized this
interest.
91. 1988 Basle Capical Accord, supra note 43, at ~ 3. The second stated goal is "to diminish
an existing source of competitive inequality among international banks." I d.
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4. The Virtual Irrelevance of the Judiciary and Congress
In the constitutional law context, the judiciary and Congress are
critically important institutions. To what extent are they relevant in
the international banking law context? What relationship, if any, exists
between these institutions and the interests of the BSC and bank
regulators?
To be sure, the Federal Reserve (and other federal bank regulators)
exist in the United States constitutional context: the capital adequacy
regulations must implement a statute passed or an international agreement authorized by Congress. The statute or agreement, and the
implementing regulations, are subject to judicial review. As a practical
matter, however, there is little relation between the bank regulators'
interest in safety and soundness and the interests of the judicial and
legislative branches. Likewise, there is no relationship between the
BSC's interest in institutional relevance and the Congress or judiciary.
That is not to say that the judiciary or Congress oppose the BSC's or
regulators' interests. To the contrary, they may share these interests if
they think about them. Most judges and congresspersons, however, pay
little attention to, and have little knowledge of, international banking
law. It is likely that many are unaware of the BSC's existence and
importance, and few know much about Federal Reserve functions aside
from setting and implementing monetary policy. Capital adequacy
rules are sure to appear byzantine to judges and congresspersons, and;
unless widespread public confidence in the banking system is at stake,
they will not boost the re-election prospects of legislators.
In the risk-based capital era (i.e., post-1992, when the Basle Accord
as implemented through federal regulations took full effect), there has
yet to be a court case raising a material issue about either the substance
of the Accord or the implementing regulations.92 Judicial non-involvement in this arena is to be contrasted with its highly significant role
in shaping international trade law. Cases involving highly technical
trade remedy laws such as antidumping and countervailing duties are
routinely filed with the United States Court of International Trade, a
specialized court dedicated to hearing such cases.93
The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (hereinafter,
"ILSA") illustrates Congress's hands-off approach to international bank92. There have been cases in which the authority of Federal bank regulators to address capital
adequacy problems was at issue. See, e.g., First National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 697 F.2d 67 4 (Sth Cir. 1983) (questioning the Comptroller's authority regarding capital
adequacy); First Nat'! Bank of Scotia v. Dept. of the Treasury, 659 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1981)
(upholding the authority of the Comptroller of the Currency to consider a capital adequacy
problem as an "unsafe and unsound" banking practice). [Second Circuit rules prohibit the citation
or use in unrelated cases of decisions without formal opinions.} After these cases, Congress appears
to have resolved any doubts by srarute. See 12 U.S.C. § 3907.
93. See BHAU, supra note 58, at chs. 4, 7-S.

24

Harvard International Law ]o11rnal I Vol. 38

ing law.94 In the ILSA, Congress essentially delegated authority to the
Federal Reserve to negotiate international capital adequacy guidelines
for commercial banks. The result was the Basle Accord. The Accord is
too general to be self-executing,95 but instead of implementing it by
statute, Congress was content to let the federal bank regulators implement it by regulation.96 Even post-ILSA legislation has been rather
short on detailed capital adequacy rules.97 Again, this history is to be
contrasted with congressional involvement in international trade negotiations, particularly in the Uruguay Round and North American Free
Trade Agreement. In these negotiations, Congress delegated fast-track
negotiating authority to the Executive.98 Nonetheless, it remained
substantially involved in the negotiations, and it even retained and
exercised the right to include members of Congress on the United
States Trade Representative's negotiating delegation.99 The NAFTA
and Uruguay Round agreements were implemented into United States
law by Congressional action, as well as through regulations by the
relevant executive agencies. 100
In summary, the relevant institutional players in international banking law are entirely different from those to whom Professors Eskridge
and Frickey apply their "law as equilibrium" approach. As discussed
in Part III below, the inference to be drawn from this fact is that there
is no well developed system of checks and balances in international
banking law. In turn, a new definition of a stable equilibrium is
needed.

94. See supra note 88.
95. An international agreement is classified as self-executing if "it imposes immediate obligations within the treaty irself; and, alternatively, as merely a declaration of intent when it contains
general statementS of principle setting a standard of achievement for all parties." Louis B. Sohn,
International lmpliCtJtions of the 1994 Agreement, in FUNDAMENTAL PERSPEcriVES ON INTERNA·
TIONAL LAW 315-16 (William R. Slomanson ed., 2d ed. 1995).
96. See supra notes 70-71.
97. For example, with respect to the capital provisions ofFIRREA and FDICIA, sec s11pra note
87.
98. See BHALA, supra note 58, at ch. 4.
99. See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE lAw, supra note 58, at ch. 4 and Harold Hongju Koh,
The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 145-61 (1992).
100. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, H.R. Doc. No. 159,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 4, 1993), Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.); The Uruguay Round AgreementS Act, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (Sept. 27, 1994), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Star. 4809 (codified in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C.). See generally HOUSE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION
OF U.S. 1iw>E STATUTES, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 186-87, 199-200 (Comm. Print 1995)
(discussing the two Aces).
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III. DEFINING A STABLE EQUILIBRIUM

Every definition is dangerous.
-Desiderius ErasmuslOl

A. The Lack of Formal Checks and Balances
Professors Eskridge and Frickey contend that a stable equilibrium
exists when "no implementing institution is able to interpose a new
view without being overridden by another institution." 102 This definition is inappropriate for assessing legal regimes in international banking. It assumes the existence of a well-developed scheme of institutional
checks and balances. This assumption is valid in the United States
constitutional context, but there is no analogous system of checks and
balances in the international banking context.
To be sure, there is a process of adjustment of capital adequacy
proposals that involves a sequential interaction among the BSC, domestic regulators, and banks. 103 Yet, at any point, regulators like the
Federal Reserve can decline to implement BSC rules, ignore BSC
proposals, and override self-regulatory measures of banks. While the
Federal Reserve is subject to familiar administrative law constraints, as
a practical matter, neither Congress nor the judiciary is likely to
overrule its exercise of discretion in the international banking arena.
In practiCe, legal power lies with the domestic regulators.
Consider the relationship between the BSC and a domestic bank
regulator like the Federal Reserve. Unless Congress breaks with its
usual custom and enacts specific legislation to force the hand of the
Federal Reserve, the regulator can choose whether and how to implement BSC rules and proposals. The Federal Reserve might destroy its
international credibility if it flagrantly disregards the BSC's issuances.
But it would not be violating any international obligation arising from
these issuances, 104 and, as noted above, the BSC has no authority to
impose obligations on banks. 105 Indeed, it is the BSC that must attend
to the concerns of the Federal Reserve. Given the BSC's- interest in
continuing as a leading forum for international banking matters, as
101. DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, ADAGIA (1500) quoted in THE GREAT THOUGHTS 132 (George
Seider ed., 1985).
102. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 32.
103. See S11pra notes 83-S4 and accompanying text.
104. Furthermore, as discussed in the derivative article, as a matter of public international law
these issuances do not amount to binding international agreements. See Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory, supra note 12, at Parts II.D & III.B.3 (discussing the authority of the BSC).
105. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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discussed above, 106 it cannot afford to alienate the world's most powerful central bank.
Consider the relationship between the Federal Reserve and banks;
the latter are free to devise their own capital adequacy rules and indeed
are doing so. 107 Such rules, however, operate in the shadow of domestic
bank regulations. No self-regulatory regime can exist without the
express or tacit consent of the domestic bank regulators. Banks subject
to Federal Reserve regulation must fear the Federal Reserve, not the
BSC. By avoiding conflict with the Federal Reserve, they reduce the
risk of particularized reprisal in the form of bank examiners scrutinizing their operations (outside of the ordinary examination cycle). They
also lessen the chance that the Federal Reserve will adopt a prophylactic measure that might raise the cost of foreign exchange transactions
(e.g., by raising capital adequacy requirements) or even force such
transactions ·offshore (e.g., by barring certain types of deals in the
United States).
In sum, a domestic bank regulator can override the BSC or banks
in the areas of capital adequacy rules and proposals because these items
are not the products of an adjustment process with carefully calibrated
checks and balances. 108 For their part, the BSC and banks generally
want to avoid overrides in order to protect their own interests. This
skewed situation demonstrates that the Eskridge-Frickey definition of
a stable equilibrium should not be transferred to the international
banking law context. If it were applied literally to any international
banking law regime, the regime would be found inherently unstable.
Because it is not fruitful to employ a systematically biased definition,
a definition tailored for the present context is needed.

B. The Static-Dynamic Distinction
Before tailoring a definition of a stable equilibrium for legal regimes
in international banking, it is important to identify and to avoid a
pitfall associated with the Eskridge-Frickey definition: it pays in106. See Jtpra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
107. See Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory, Jupra note 12, at 100 (discussing internal value ac
risk models).
108. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, Jupra note 20, at 38. As Professors Eskridge and Frickey point
out, overrides ace not the only way interdependent lawmaking institutions communicate with
one another. These institutions may send "signals" co one another, that is, indicate expressions
of preference chat ace noc legal auchoricy yer still may have legal consequences. Signals are an
efficient means of conflict avoidance and may lead to implicit bargains among institutions, and
even the achievement of a legal equilibrium. See id. at 39-41. For instance, the Federal Reserve
may send signals co the BSC or banks through policy statements, informal discussions, and public
lectures at forums like che Practicing Law Institute. These signals may be created by the BSC or
banks as evidence of the Federnl Reserve's most important preferences and the nature of the legal
equilibrium the Federnl Reserve would like co achieve.
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sufficient attention to the distinction between a static and dynamic
equilibrium. This distinction is important for international banking
lawyers. The rules which their clients live by are constantly changing.
The correct inference from such change is not clear. For instance, it is
tempting to say that the high frequency of BSC capital adequacy
proposals signifies that the capital adequacy regime is unstable. 109 But
is it correct to conclude that the BSC's proposals, if implemented,
would destabilize the regime? Or is the proper inference that their
implementation would cause a somewhat inelegant shift from one
stable equilibrium to another?
A concept of stability based in part on neoclassical economic theory
helps to clarify these issues. 110 Neoclassical economic theory distinguishes between static and dynamic equilibria, each of which may be
stable or unstable. A static equilibrium is one which does not change. 111
For example, in the market for Japanese yen, if¥ 100 per dollar is a
rate which persists, then it is a stable equilibrium. 112 With respect to
the duration· of a static equilibrium, neoclassical theory identifies three
possibilities: momentary, short-run, and long-run equilibria. 113 Distinguishing among these time periods is imprecise. In general, as time
passes the supply of a good-such as yen--can increase, whereas a
momentary equilibrium is associated with a fixed supply. 114 A static
equilibrium is stable if it is restored in the event of a temporary
movement away from the equilibrium. 115 Suppose a¥ 100 per dollar

109. See infra notes 155-170 and accompanying text.
110. The discussion below presumes that an equilibrium (either static or dynamic) exists. This
assumption is not always correct. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. Accordingly, economists
typically ask three questions: First, does an equilibrium exist? Second, if one does exist, then is
it stable? Third, if there is a stable equilibrium, then is it unique or are there multiple stable
equilibria? See ]AN VAN DAAL & ALBERT ]DUNK, THE EQUIUBRIUM ECONOMICS OF lEON
WALRAS 159-63 (1993).
111. See, e.g., WilliAM]. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BUNDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POUCY
81 (6th ed. 1994) ("'[a]n equilibrium is a situation in which there are no inherent forces that
produce change; that is, a situation that does not contain the seeds of its own destruction")
(emphasis origianl); EDWIN MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 43 (7th ed. 1992)
("[a]n equilibrium is a situation where there is no tendency for change: in other words, it is a
situation that can persist. Thus, an equilibrium price is a price that can be maintained.")
(emphasis added); MICHAEL STEWART, KEYNES AND AFTER 89 (1967) ("'A ·situation is an
equilibrium one if there is no tendency for any of the variables to depart from their existing levels.")
(emphasis added).
112. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILUAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 24 (15th ed. 1995);
PAUL A. SAMUElSON, ECONOMICS 57-61, 609-10 (11th ed. 1980).
113. See BAUMOL & BUNDER, supra note 111, at 225-37; SAMUElSON & NORDHAUS, supra
note 111, at 252-53; SAMUElSON, supra note 112, at 362; ToDD G. BuCHHOlZ, NEw IDEAS
FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS 152-57 (1989); PHYLLIS DEANE, THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC
IDEAS 118 (1978).
114. SAMUElSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 112, at 134-36; SAMUElSON, supra note 112, at
362.
115. BAUMOL & BUNDER, supra note 111, at 81, 83. See also MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC
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exchange rate is altered, perhaps because of an extrinsic shock like the
insolvency of a Japanese bank or a vote of no confidence in a Japanese
government. Because the equilibrium is static, with respect to market
forces specifically, the supply of and demand for yen and the determinants of these supply and demand functions will cause a readjustment
back to the¥ 100 per dollar rate. If the market for yen does not return
to this price, then it was not a stable equilibrium in the first place.
In contrast, a dynamic equilibrium is one that changes over time. 11 6
For example, an econometric model of the dollar-yen market might
forecast the following equilibrium exchange rates: on October 1, ¥ 100
per dollar; on November 1, ¥ 125 per dollar; and on December 1,
¥ 150 per dollar. 117 The expected equilibrium rates vary because of
changes in market forces, specifically the supply of and demand for
yen, and the determinants of these supply and demand functions. For
instance, if the Federal Reserve embarks on a contractionary monetary
policy, then the supply of dollars will decrease, causing dollars to
appreciate relative to the yen, perhaps from¥ 100 to¥ 150 per dollar.
A dynamic equilibrium is stable if there is movement toward the
hypothesized equilibrium forecasts, even if at any point these hypothesized values are never reached. 118 Accordingly, suppose on October 1
the observed exchange rate is ¥ 95 per dollar, on November 1 it is
¥ 123 per dollar, and on December 1 it is ¥ 149 per dollar. This
dynamic equilibrium is stable because the market for yen is tending
toward the hypothesized equilibria of¥ 100, ¥ 125, and ¥ 150 per
dollar on the respective dates, i.e., the market is converging toward
THEORY IN RETROSPECT 429 (3d ed. 1978) (stating that "[b}y stability we mean the requirement
that the system should return to equilibrium after any small 'shock"').
116. See DEANE, THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC IDEAS, Jupra note 113, at 208 (discussing
John Maynard Keynes' interest "in the problems of an economy in a state of disequilibrium and
in the process of its change thro11gh time") (emphasis added).
117. Several 20th-century theories of economic growth also illustrate the concept of dynamic
equilibria. For example, Schumpeter developed a concept of the stationary state and explained
how growth from this quasi-equilibrium point occurs as a result of innovation and entrepreneur·
ship. See JoSEPH A. ScHUMPETER, THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 406-24
(Richard Swedberg ed., 1991); DEANE, Jllpra note 113, at 191-93; JOSEPH SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1943);JOSEPH ScHUMPETER, THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1934). The Harrod-Domar model posits a direct relationship between equilibrium growth in per capita income and effective demand increasing at a rate warranted by the
growth of the capital stock. This model explains divergences from the equilibrium growth path
by inaccurate entrepreneurial expectations about demand increases resulting in incorrect invest·
ment decisions. See R.E HARROD, TOWARDS A DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1948); EVSEY V. DOMAR,
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1957); DEANE, Jllpra note 113, at 196-99.
The post-war neoclassical school postulates an aggregate production function with two flexible
inputs, capiral and labor, that are substitutable over the range of current technology. A stable
equilibrium growth rate depends on the factor input mix which, in turn, depends on shifts in
factor prices. See DEANE, Jupra note 113, at 200-01.
118. VAN DAAL & JOUNK, 111pra note 110, at 159-63. See a/Jo SAMUElSON, Jllpra note 112,
at 381-82 (discussing a dynamic cobweb equilibrium).
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the forecasts of the econometric model. In contrast, rates of ¥ 95,
¥ 115, and ¥ 135 per dollar suggest ever-increasing deviations from
the hypothesized dynamic equilibrium points on October 1, November
1, and December 1, and, therefore, dynamic disequilibrium. As one
economist wrote, "[t]o justify special preoccupation with the position
of equilibrium it is necessary to assert as an empirically testable truth
that there is a tendency towards this position in our economic system, or
that readjustments in general come quicker than new disturbances
occur. "119
The concept of a dynamic equilibrium is a more realistic depiction
of observed phenomena-namely, changes in prices for goods, services,
and financial instruments-than its static counterpart. As Alfred Marshall wrote,
[W]hen pushed to its more remote and intricate logical consequence, it [the theory of static equilibria] slips away from the
conditions of rea/life. In fact we are here verging on the high theme
of economic progress; and here therefore it is especially needful to
remember that economic problems are imperfectly presented when
they are treated as problems of statical equilibrium and not of
organic growth. 120
'

Marshall's point similarly applies to legal problems. Because legal rules
change, a dynamic equilibrium is the relevant concept in international
banking law.
Applying the neoclassical economic concept in the present context,
however, is challenging. The dollar-yen market example indicates that
stability is determined by comparing the magnitude of changes in
relation to a set of hypothesized equilibrium prices: the movement
from¥ 95 to 123 to 149 per dollar is stable because observed exchange
rates close in on numerical forecasts of dynamic equilibria, whereas the
opposite is true for the¥ 95 to¥ 115 to¥ 135 per dollar movements.
Thus, for example, to apply the neoclassical concept to the capital
adequacy regime requires answers to two inquiries. First, what hypothetical capital adequacy regime would be a stable dynamic equilibrium? Second, how should the magnitude of changes in the capital
adequacy regime be measured?
119. T.W. Hutchison quoted in MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 160 (2d
ed. 1992).
120. ALFRED 1\fARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 382 (8th ed. 1952) (emphasis added).
For an imroduccion to Marshall's work, see BUCHHOlZ, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS,
s11pra note 112, at 141-68 and BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECI", supra note 115, at
343-447 (3d ed. 1978).
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It is difficult to provide these answers. With respect to the first
inquiry, a generic answer of little use is to say that a stable dynamic
capital adequacy regime equilibrium would be one that maximizes the
difference between total benefits and total costs, where such benefits
and costs encompass both private and social interests. An alternative
would be to try to construct a new capital adequacy regime. 121 Depending on the amount of work entailed, this alternative might be
unattractive.
The second inquiry calls for an empirical response. It is necessary to
know the amount by which capital charges for every banking transaction would increase as a result of rules proposed by the BSC. 122 Again,
the significant effort entailed makes this endeavor unattractive. Moreover, the effort may not be worthwhile because the response will vary
depending on assumptions about the transactions and interpretations
of the proposals. In sum, in the present context, a systematic and
empirically rigorous application of the neoclassical economic concept
of dynamic stability may be unrealistic.
Nevertheless, the insights provided by this concept should be transferred to the international banking law context. The static-dynamic
distinction should be retained and, for the reasons given by Alfred
Marshall, the focus should be on dynamic equilibria. Moreover, a
four-step methodology roughly approximating the logic behind the
neoclassical concept should be adopted.
First, as in this part, a stable dynamic equilibrium in international
banking law should be defined. Second, as in Part IV below, the
determinants of stability should be identified. Third, as in Part V
below, a sketch should be made of an "ideal type" international banking law regime that likely would be a stable dynamic equilibrium.
Finally, the definition, determinants, and hypothesized ideal type should
be tested against an actual international banking law regime. 123

C. The Partial-General Distinction
There is a second pitfall to avoid that is associated with the Eskridge-Frickey definition of a stable equilibrium. That definition does
not distinguish between partial and general equilibria. Here again is a
useful neoclassical economic distinction. Whereas the static-dynamic
distinction rests on a time-series analysis of a given market, the partial-general distinction is based on a cross-sectional analysis of many
markets.
121. This task is beyond the scope of this Article.
122. Here again, this analysis exceeds the scope of the present Article.
123. This test is performed in Bhala, supra note 12.

1997 I International Banking Law

31

For instance, suppose a commodity market .price is in equilibrium.
Hence, there is neither an excess demand for nor supply of that
commodity. This occurrence says nothing about the existence (or lack
thereof) of equilibrium prices in other commodity markets. Indeed,
underlying the occurrence is an implicit assumption that all other
markets are frozen-the ceteris paribus assumption. Accordingly, the
price represents a partial equilibrium. In contrast, it is possible to
analyze all markets (that is, factor as well as commodity markets) in
an economy at a given moment and consider whether prices therein
equate the forces of demand and supply. When demand and supply in
the economy as a whole are balanced, a general equilibrium exists. 124
International banking law is a universe comprised of various legal
regimes. In turn, each legal regime is a set of existing and proposed
rules. The eight-document set of capital adequacy rules and proposals
is one legal regime. 125 Other regimes include the set of rules and
proposals governing the ability of banks to establish offices in foreign
jurisdictions 126 and the set of underwriting and dealing in cross-border
securities offerings. 127 There is no necessary connection among equilibrium conditions in different regimes because the BSC and domestic
bank regulators tackle legal issues in a sequential fashion. That is, they
do not attempt to solve all problems at once in order to achieve
stability. In 1991, for example, rules on foreign bank entry changed
dramatically, 128 but no adjustments were made to the capital adequacy
regime until the following year when the Basle Accord took full
effect. 129 Consequently, efforts by regulators may bring stability to one
regime, but have little bearing on-or even disrupt-another regime.
Importing the neoclassical distinction between a partial and general
equilibrium into the present context sharpens the methodology for
assessing international banking law. Accordingly, the determinants of
stability identified in Part IV below are designed for a partial equilibrium analysis of one legal regime. They are also designed to be generalizable to all international banking· law regimes. In this regard, they
can help evaluate equilibrium conditions in the regimes comprising
the international banking law universe.

124. See DEhNE, supra note 113, at 95-96, 112-13, 117-18, 143; BLAUG, supra note 119, at
161-69; BLAUG, supra note 115, at 602-44.
125. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
126. See BHALA, supra note 5.
127. See generally MELANIE FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS (1993); Cecelia A.
Calaby, Note, The Basle Accord: An Opportunity for Expanding Bank Holding Company Securities
Adivities?, 23 GEo. WASH. J. lNT'L 1. & EcoN. 531, 534-49 (1989).
128. See BHALA, supra note 5.
129. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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The simplicity of the neoclassical distinction masks the difficulty
associated with deciding whether to focus on a regime and engage in
a partial equilibrium analysis or to focus on all regimes and engage in
a general equilibrium analysis. On the one hand, no reliable inference
can be drawn about the stability of international banking law from a
conclusion about the stability of a regime, even one as important as
capital adequacy. After all, as indicated above, partial equilibrium
analysis implies an unrealistic but necessary ceteris paribus assumption.l30 On the other hand, focusing on a field might provide macrolevel insights. But it also may entail a Herculean analytical task.

D. A Word on Game Theory
A caveat should be offered concerning neoclassical economic imports. There are alternative economic perspectives on the concept of an
equilibrium. A noteworthy example is the game theoretic concept of
a Nash equilibrium. In a non-cooperative game, each player "is concerned with doing as well for himself as possible subject to clearly
defined rules and possibilities." 131 The game can be a strategic form
one in which each player may choose among an array of strategies and
corresponding payoffs, or an extensive form one in which each player
pays attention to the timing of other players' actions and the information available when decisions about actions must be made.l3 2 A Nash
equilibrium exists when "no player has an incentive (in terms of
improving his own payoff) to deviate from his part of the strategy
array." 133
The Nash equilibrium concept might be useful in assessing the
stability of international banking regimes. For example, the BSC and
bank regulators could be considered as one player with a shared interest
in safety and soundness, and banks aggregated as the second player
with a collective interest in profits. The two players could be seen as
engaged in a non-cooperative game to determine the nature and content of rules and proposals in a regime. A Nash equilibrium could be
redefined in this context as one in which neither player has an incentive
to tty to change the regime at issue. By hypothesizing a set of strategies and payoffs, it might be possible to identify the existence and
determinants of such an equilibrium. In sum, while the definition of
130. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
131. DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODEUNG 9 (1990). See a/so SAMUEL•
SON & NORDHAUS, supra note 112, at 189-92; MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY (rev. ed.
1983).
132. KREPS, supra note 131, at 10-21.
133. ld. at 28. See a/so SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 112, at 192; DAVIS, supra note
131, at 11-19.
,
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equilibrium offered below relies on neoclassical distinctions, future
research on a game-theoretic paradigm would be welcome.

E. Legitimate Reasons for Significant Opposition from Banks
Establishing that a definition of stability in international banking
law ought to (1) refer to a dynamic equilibrium and (2) encompass
partial or general circumstances is necessary material for tailoring a
new definition. The next step is to consider the addressees of a legal
regime (or regimes). The addressees are, of course, banks.
1. Bank Opposition as Destabilizing

Suppose a regime engenders significant controversy among banks.
Their concern might be that the regime is unlikely to meet its intended objective or could impose debilitating costs on banks. The most
probable reaction from banks is they will push the authority responsible for creating the regime to modify the regime134 or even start anew
with a new regime. A second possible reaction is that banks will
attempt to devise their own regime and persuade the authority that it
should permit self-regulation. Either reaction suggests that the initial
regime is not likely to endure. Significant bank opposition is potentially destabilizing to the regime.
To be sure, the BSC could issue, and domestic bank regulators could
impose, a regime on banks regardless of bank concerns. But this
scenario wrongly ascribes to the BSC and bank regulators a high degree
of forcefulness and brutality. Neither player is, or can afford to be,
unresponsive to the concerns of its ultimate constituency. Indeed, the
BSC typically asks banks to comment on its proposals and carefully
reviews comments received.l35 ·
The BSC and regulators are well aware that banks can shift their
operations "offshore" to countries outside the G-10 group that do not
automatically follow the BSC's regime. Because international banking
markets, such as the foreign exchange market, are networks of computers, telephones, and fax machines, it is not particularly problematic
134. This reaction indicates the possible relevance of public choice theory to the present
context. Sre DANIEL A. FARBER & PIDUP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBUC CHOICE (1991), (explaining
public choice theory) and Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Sdence of Regulating Bank RiJk, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1277, 1278-90 (1989) (applying the public choice model of government decision-making
to banking policy).
135. See, e.g., Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, The Prudential Supervision of Netting, Market Risks and Interest Rate Risk, ~ 2 at 1 (Apr. 1993); 1993 Market Risk Proposal,
supra note 75, ~~ 8-9 at 3; Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Press Statement, July 15,
1994; 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 78, ~~ !.3, II.l at 1; April 1995 Press Release,
supra note 80, ~ 1 at 1; 1995 Proposal to Issue Supplement, supra note 80, ~ 1 at 1 and ~ II.5
at 2; 1996 Overview, supra note 81, ~ !!.7 at 3.
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for a bank to shift the locus of its trading activity from New York to
the Cayman Islands. 136 As a consequence, banks can and do wield
influence, typically in the form of oral and written comments on
existing and proposed rules in a legal regime.l37
2. The Definition and its Assumptions
The possible destabilizing effect of banks' reactions to a regime
suggests a definition of a stable dynamic equilibrium. A legal regime
in international banking is likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium
if banks would not have legitimate reasons to present significant opposition to
that regime. This definition rests on four implicit assumptions.
First, the word "legitimate" (and, to a lesser extent, the word
"significant") acknowledges that qpposition could amount to nothing
more than sour grapes. "Legitimate" assumes it is possible to distinguish mere whining from thoughtful criticisms. This distinction must
be made on a case-by-case basis. Fortunately, it ought to be unnecessary
to make this distinction very often. It is not rational for a bank to
whine habitually about legal regimes. Rather, exercising self-restraint
and providing criticisms when its interest in profits is seriously threatened comports with that interest. To "cry wolf' distracts the bank from
profitable opportunities and, worse, undermines its credibility with the
BSC and domestic bank regulators.
Second, the definition assumes it is possible to distinguish opposition to a regime from opposition to a particular rule or proposal in
that regime. Again, judgment must be rendered on a case-by-case
basis. For example, consider the BSC's proposal to require a bank to
convert an option into a long or short currency position on the basis
of deltas in order to determine the appropriate capital charge against
the market risk associated with that option.l38 On the one hand, if the
bank disputes the value of the delta even though the value is accepted
by its regulator for use in making the conversion, then the bank is not
mounting a challenge to the capital adequacy regime. On the other
hand, if the bank argues that deltas are an inappropriate basis for
conversion and a completely different methodology ought to be used,
then it is making a fundamental criticism about the nature of the
regime.

136. Of course, some potential loci may present time zone, personnel, client support, or
infrastructure problems.
137. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying texr.
138. See Bhala, supra note 12, at Parr II.B.2. A delta is "the expected change of nn option's
price as a proportion of a small change in the price of the underlying instrument." 1993 Market
Risk Proposal, supra note 75, Annex 1, at 43.
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One technique for distinguishing opposition to a rule from opposition to a regime is to consider the totality of bank opposition. Banks
may raise fundamental questions about a series of rules or proposals.
While no single question undermines the stability of the regime, the
aggregate effect of the challenges may call into question its stability.
Of course, in some cases it may be. difficult to decide whether a bank
opposes a regime. For strategic reasons, it may cloak the intent that
underlies its comments on rules or proposals of the regime. Even in
these hard cases, an effort should be made to gauge the magnitude of
the bank's opposition. As intimated above, the seductive inference to
avoid is that every criticism and subsequent rule change destabilizes a
regime. 139
Third, the definition assumes a link between stability and durability.
After all, bank opposition is what may cause the authority responsible
for a regime to modify or replace the regime. Accordingly, the definition implies that a regime is not a stable dynamic equilibrium if it
does not endure for a sustained period of time. The obvious next
question is what is a "sustained" period in international bartking law? 140
No single, unequivocal answer applies to all regimes, so here again
judgment is required. Suppose banks accept a regime for ten years, but
thereafter oppose it because of a changed financial climate. Was the
regime stable for ten years, and thereafter unstable, or was it unstable
from the beginning? The answer will depend on the regime, and with
respect to some -regimes reasonable minds may debate the answer.
Finally, the definition makes a ceteris paribus assumption with respect
to popular views of an international banking law regime. That is, it is
assumed that there is no major outrage among the public, and no
consequent lobbying campaign, to change a regime. Put differently, it
is assumed that the judiciary and legislature continue to be irrelevant.
This assumption seems reasonable in that international banking law
matters (as distinct from crises that implicate taxpayer funds like the
Mexican peso devaluation and the U.S. financial bailout) tend to engender little public interest.
In sum, the implicit assumptions leave room for international banking lawyers to exercise discretion when applying the definition of
stability. Lest this fact be viewed as a serious shortcoming, it should
be observed that ambiguities in the Eskridge-Frickey definition of a
stable equilibrium invite debate among constitutional lawyers .. What

139. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
140. This question may help explain why it is not redundant to speak of an "equilibrium" as
"stable." The word "stable" connotes a time element associated with "equilibrium," whereas the
latter word is "time-neutral." Whether an equilibrium is "stable" or "unstable" depends on
whether it persists over a certain period.
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is a "balance" among competing institutional forces? When is it clear
that a balance is struck? When can one institution be said to override
another? Simply stated, a lawyer should expect to argue about whether
a definition fits her fact pattern. 141 ,
3. Four Virtues
There are four virtues in defining stability in terms of legitimate
bank opposition. The definition (i) avoids bias, (ii) is methodologically
Bexible, (iii) is normatively neutral, and (iv) does not assume a stable
equilibrium exists.
a. Avoiding Bias
A practical problem associated with the application of equilibrium
theoty is whether to focus on the universe of international banking law,
a regime within that universe (e.g., the aforementioned eight documents that comprise the capital adequacy regime), or a specific rule or
proposil within a regime (e.g., a rule on use of deltas to compute the
market risk capital charge for options). This problem plagues the
Eskridge-Frickey approach, which posits that a stable equilibrium
exists when "no implementing institution is able to interpose a new
view without being overridden by another institution." 142 What reference is envisioned-is the stability of a field of law, individual regime,
or specific rule or proposal at issue?
The definition of equilibrium for international banking law focuses
on a legal regime rather than a specific rule or proposal in the regime.
This focus is justified for the reason intimated above, namely, a narrow
focus on a rule or proposal introduces a bias in favor of concluding that
the rule or proposal is an unstable equilibrium. 14 3 The bias exists
because rules change frequently, and proposals are made all the time.
In contrast, by analyzing a regime, it is understood that rules and
proposals are in a state of flux, but this state does not necessarily
destabilize the regime. In brief, examining a regime prevents one from
being mesmerized by movements within that regime.
b. Methodological Flexibility
The definition is methodologically flexible because it does not require
demonstrated opposition from banks. The inference that a regime is
unstable is strengthened if banks manifest publicly their disapproval
141. See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN 1NTRODUCI10N TO LEGAL REASONING 3-10 (1948)
(discussing classifications, categories, and phases of legal reasoning).
142. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 32.
143. See supra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
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of the regime. Nonetheless, the phrase "would not have legitimate
reasons" in the definition is meant to allow external observers-most
notably international banking law scholars-to suggest arguments banks
might make in the future, or might have made already, in opposition
to a regime. This flexibility is necessary because of the informal ways
a bank might express its views to the BSC or its regulator. It might
present criticisms orally in a meeting or send a confidential letter,
neither of which is discoverable by the scholar. To be sure, this lack of
transparency presents a challenge for the scholar to empathize with the
bank and avoid either underestimating or overestimating its possible
opposition.
The definition is methodologically flexible in another sense. It allows
for partial or general equilibrium analyses. To be sure, because it speaks
of a regime, it expressly presumes a partial equilibrium analysis at a
regime level and fluency with the regime components (i.e., all rules
and proposals in the regime). The definition, however, permits general
equilibrium analyses because it is easily expandable to encompass bank
opposition to multiple regimes.
c. Normative Neutrality
The definition does not assume stability is "good" or "better" than
"instability." Certainly there are a number of arguments in favor of a
stable international banking law regime. 144 From a bank's perspective,
stability provides addressees of rules and proposals in the regime with
certainty and predictability. 145 For instance, uncertain, unpredictable
capital adequacy rules are an undesirable overhang on the foreign
exchange market if banks cannot gauge a priori the effect of such rules
on the cost of their transactions. Instability raises transaction costs in
part because banks must employ lawyers to understand and ensure
compliance with all applicable rules. In contrast, a stable regime
reduces inefficiency by allowing a bank to focus on profitable opportunities rather than deploy resources to adjust to changed rules. Sta144. Interestingly, Professors Eskridge and Frickey argue that the dialectical process by which
the Supreme Court interacts with other institutions to interpret statutes reconciles democratic
values with the rule of law. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 77. Through this process,
democratically elected decision makers internalize values of predictability and stability, while
rule-of-law decision makers internalize values of popular accountability. Id. This argument raises
an interesting question in the international banking law context: would a stable equilibrium be
attractive because it is democratic? A negative answer seems in order. None of the three
institutional players in the international banking law context is democratically elected, and none
is properly characterized as a rule-of-law decisionmaker. Currency traders at banks almost certainly
do not see themselves as representative of a country or their employers shareholders.
145. Professors Eskridge and Frickey acknowledge the importance of certainty and predictability associated with the rule oflaw. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 77, 81, 87.
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bility also minimizes barriers to entry, because potential entrants could
be deterred by legal chaos.
Likewise, from the BSC's perspective, stability may be good. It may
further the BSC's interest in institutional relevance. For example, if the
capital adequacy regime is unstable, then banks may become frustrated
with the BSC, seeing it at best as well-meaning but clumsy, and at
worst as incompetent and destructive. Banks may seek to defuse the
BSC's product, and marginalize the BSC, possibly by developing a
self-regulatory regime. 146 That is, the BSC knows banks might complain to their regulators which, in turn, might urge the BSC to revise
its regime or simply distance themselves from the regime. Thus, the
BSC may be unlikely to issue rules or proposals that it expects to
change significantly in the near future because of bank opposition. On
the contrary, it may try to "get it right" the first time before issuing
the rules or proposals.
Yet while "central banks [and the BSC] have made stability their
god," markets are sometimes said to "thrive on instability." 147 To be
sure, this statement typically refers to movements in market prices,
not market rules. 148 Still, plausible reasons could exist to suggest that
legal instability is beneficial to some players under certain conditions.
For example, might the BSC's stature as a plurilateral forum be enhanced through crises that cause officials from domestic bank regulators to travel to Basle to concoct new rules in the same way foreign
ministers meet at the United Nations Security Council to resolve
international political emergencies? 149 Accordingly, defining equilibrium in terms of opposition from banks is designed to yield normative
neutrality on this matter.
d. Existence of a Stable Dynamic Equilibrium
The definition of equilibrium acknowledges the practitioner's perspective that the idea of "stability" in the context of international
banking law is an oxymoron. Indeed, an academic basis for this perspective exists: Professor Arrow's Nobel Prize winning impossibility
theorem indicates that under certain circumstances a market might not
146. Indeed, as discussed in the derivative atticle, this scenario might help explain why the
BSC adopted in 1995 a two-track approach to capital rules for matket risk, and why banks have
developed their own risk management methodologies. See Bhala, Applying Eqrlilibrirm1 Theury, Jllpra
note 12, at Part lli.
147. MARJORIE DEANE & ROBERT PRINGLE, THE CENTML BANKS 307 {1994).
148. The idea is that some banks can and do profit from short-term instability in certain
markets.
149. During this author's tenure at the Federal Reserve, one senior Federal Reserve Bank of
New York official proudly and publicly proclaimed he and other senior officials were "crisis
junkies."
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have any equilibrium. 150 The definition does not presume a stable
dynamic equilibrium exists.
But even if an international banking law regime is not stable, it
does not mean stability cannot exist and is impossible to achieve. Put
differently, the practitioner's perspective can be interpreted not as
learned helplessness but rather as a desperate plea to the BSC to "do
something." Quite possibly, heretofore the BSC has been insufficiently
attentive to the reactions of banks to regimes, and to factors that could
render regimes acceptable to banks. Indeed, a practical insight provided by equilibrium theoty and the FICAS model discussed in Part
IV below is to re-orient the BSC toward bank reactions and to highlight such factors.

rv.

DETERMINANTS OF A STABLE DYNAMIC
EQUILIBRIUM: THE FICAS MODEL

In principle, the best rules are ones that encourage those to whom they
apply to act in their own best interests under the threat ofpenalties if they
do foolish or dangerous things. 15 1
The definition of equilibrium presented in Part III above is logically
connected to the new FICAS model of the determinants of stability.
The definition calls for a review of the rules in and proposals for a
regime. Do they present banks with a reason for opposing the regime
and thereby contain the seeds of the regime's destruction? To answer
this question, it is necessary to understand what factors move banks to
oppose a regime. That is, it is necessary to have a conceptual framework
of the determinants of stability. Only by identifying these determinants
is it possible to predict whether banks are likely to support or oppose
a regime.
Perhaps the most fundamental unresolved issue raised by the Eskridge-Frickey approach to law as equilibrium concerns the variables
that affect stability. What are the determinants of stability of a legal
regime? In the present context, the issue may be rephrased in terms
of the above definition of stability: 152 what determines whether banks might
have reason to oppose a regime? The obvious answer is "a threat to banks'
150. See Kenneth Arrow, A Theorem on Expectations and the Stability of Equilibrium, 24 EcoNOMETRICA 288 (1956); Kenneth Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, Some Remarks on the Equilibrium of Economic
Systems, 28 ECONOMETRICA 640 (1960). For a general study of Professor Arrow's work, see
GEORGE FEIWEL, ARROW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ThEORIES OF ECONOMIC POUCY
(1987). For a discussion of the repercussions of his work on political outcomes and the public
interest, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 133, at 38-62.
151. Bettering Bas/e, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 78.
152. Sre supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
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self-interest identified above, namely, profits." 153 But this generic answer merely masks the deep issue: what factors associated with a
regime are likely to generate concern among banks that their "bottom
line" is threatened? Addressing this issue helps organize thinking
about change in international banking law. Moreover, the issue has
important policy implications. If the BSC understands the determinants of stability, then it may be able to predict whether existing and
proposed rules will contribute to the stability of, or destabilize, a
regime.
Thus, a model of the determinants of stability of an international
banking law regime is needed. From such a model, an ideal type of
regime that would represent a stable dynamic equilibrium can be
derived. The FICAS model is one such model, and self-regulation
(discussed in Part V below) is an ideal type of regime.
The FICAS model identifies five independent variables that are
hypothesized to affect the dependent variable, a stable dynamic equilibrium. The five independent variables are frequency, intricacy, cogency, authority, and scope, or "FICAS" for short. Hence, the following
conceptual equation:
Achievement of a Stable Dynamic Equilibrium Regime in International Banking = Function of {frequency of adjustment to ru1es
and proposals in the regime; intricacy of rules and proposals;
cogency of rules and proposals; authority of ru1es and proposals;
scope of rules and proposals}.
The FICAS model rests on general propositions about whether an
existing or proposed rule in a regime is likely to garner a consensus of
support among banks and thereby contribute to the stability of the
overall regime. These propositions are hypothesized causal relationships
between each of the five independent FICAS variables, on the one hand,
and the dependent variable, stability of a regime, on the other hand.
That is, the model sets forth a priori hypotheses about a direct or
inverse causal relationship between each independent variable and the
dependent variable. These hypotheses are set forth in Table 1 and
discussed below.
Four caveats should be noted. First, the hypothesized link is not
necessarily one that would be universally observed. Real-world exceptions to each hypothesis may exist. Instead, the hypotheses are probabilistic statements (i.e., forecasts) grounded on reasonable expectations
of the behavior of banks.
153. See sll]lra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1
HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FICAS
VARIABLES AND THE STABILITY OF A LEGAL REGIME IN
INTERNATIONAL BANKING
FICAS Independent Variables Hypothesized Relationship of
Independent Variable to the Dependent Variable (Stability of
International Banking Law Regime)

Frequency

Inverse relationship. High adjustment frequency with respect to
rules and- proposals in a regime is
likely to undermine the stability
of the regime.

Intricacy

Inv:erse relationship. Simpler, more
flexible rules and proposals in a
regime are likely to enhance the
stabilitv of the regime.

Cogency

Direct relationship. Persl.l3Sive, wellgrounded rules and proposals in a
regime are likely to contribute to
the stabilitv of the regime.

Attthority

Direct relationship. Rules or proposals in a regime that banks
accept as authoritative are likely
to enhance the stability of the regime.

Scope

Direct relationship. Comprehensive
applicability of rules and proposals in a regime is likely to foster
stability in the regime.

Second, at any point in time some independent variables may operate
to promote stability, while others may cut against stability. Whether
stability is achieved may depend on the relative strengths of the effects
of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The FICAS
model does not help predict the relative strengths of these effects. In
econometric terms, the FICAS model does not generate "coefficients"
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for each independent variable. 154 That issue is left to an examination
of a particular BSC rule or proposal at issue.
Third, there could be interaction among the five independent variables. In econometric terms, there could be "multicollinearity" among
these variables. 155 For example, rules in a regime may become more
intricate, and proposals may be made with greater frequency, in an
effort to broaden the scope of a regime. Fourth, there may be "optimality levels" associated with two of the hypothesized relationships.
Banks may find a specific adjustment frequency or degree of intricacy
to be ideal. Their opposition to a regime may be triggered when the
BSC's rules or proposals exceed these levels. By design, the FICAS
model does not define these levels. Different banks may have different
tolerance levels for frequency of adjustment and degree of intricacy. In
this respect, self-regulation (discussed in Part V below) is advantageous
because it leaves banks free to define for themselves the optimal levels.
In contrast, there are no optimal levels for cogency or authority. It is
hard to imagine a regime that is "too" cogent or that has "too" strong
a basis of authority. Likewise, as long as a regime correctly identifies
similarly situated parties and treats them in a substantively equal
manner, the regime is unlikely to be "too" comprehensive in scope.

A. Frequency of Adjustment
In The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller speaks of the "inner morality of
law," 156 which is defined in terms of "procedural" principles legislators
must respect when devising and administering an efficacious system of
rules for governing human conduct. 157 Failure to adhere to these principles is a recipe for disaster and results not just in a bad system of
law, but in something that ought not to be considered a legal system
at all.l5 8 One of Fuller's principles is that "laws should not be changed
154. See DALE J. POIRIER, INTERMEDIATE STATISTICS AND ECONOMETRICS-A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 460-82 (1995) and jOHN jOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC METHODS, 47-68 (1972).
155. See POIRIER, Jupra note 154, ac 567 ("[m)ulcicollinearicy is present whenever one or more
regressors are [sic] highly correlated with another regressor or a linear combination of regressors")
and RAMu RAMANATHAN, STATISTICAL METHODS IN ECONOMETRICS 317 (1993) ("multicollinearity exists when there is at lease one appro.ximacely linear set of relationships among
independent variables").
156. LON FULLER, THE MORALI1Y OF lAW 38-42 (rev. ed. 1969).
157. Id. at 33-91, 97.
158. Id. at 39. Fuller identifies eight distinct routes co disaster:
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue
must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The ocher routes are: (2) a failure co publicize, or
at least to make available to the affected patty, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the
abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but undercuts
the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the threat of
retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules undmtandable; (5) the enactment of contradictocy rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond rhe powers of the affected party;
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too frequently," 159 otherwise the addressee of the law "cannot reorient
his action" to the new laws. 160 He describes the perils of frequent
change through an allegory, the efforts of a hapless monarch Rex who
tries to reform his kingdom's laws by drafting a new code:
[B]efore the effective date for the new code had arrived, it was
discovered that so much time had been spent in successive revisions of Rex's original draft, that the substance of the code had
been seriously overtaken by events. Ever since Rex assumed the
throne there had been a suspension of ordinary legal processes and
this had brought about important economic and institutional
changes within the country. Accommodation to these altered conditions required many changes of substance in the law. Accordingly as soon as the new code became legally effective, it was
subjected to a daily stream of amendments. Again popular discontent mounted; an anonymous pamphlet appeared on the streets
carrying scurrilous cartoons of the king and a leading article with
the title: "A law that changes every day is worse than no law at
all."l61

Thus, there is no moral obligation to obey a legal rule that constantly
changes. 162 Accordingly, Fuller argues the inner morality of law demands stability of legal rules over time. 163
Fuller is not alone in highlighting the temporal nature of rules.
Professors Eskridge and Frickey imply a link berween the time a rule
has been operative and the stability of a legal equilibrium. 164 This link
exists in public international law with respect to custom: a rule is not
recognized as part of customary international law unless the proponent
of the rule can show the rule has an enduring character. 165 In sum, it
(7) introducing such frequent changes in the roles that the subject cannot orient his action by them;

and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual
administration.
Id. at 39 (emphasis added). Frequency of rule changes is discussed above. The failure to make
rules understandable is treated below in the context of the intricacy variable of the FICAS model.
See infra notes 170-175 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Fuller's eight principles of
legality, see J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 130-35 (1980) and MARTIN P. GoLDING,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 27-29, 46-50 (1975).
159. FULLER, supra note 156, at 79.
160. Id. at 39.
161. Id. at 37.
162. Id. at 39.
163. Id. at 41, 44.
164. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 31 (stating that "for eighteen years there was
a stable institutional equilibrium" with respect to the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation of a statute) (emphasis added); id. ar 81
(arguing that the Supreme Court should not "unsettle a longstanding private equilibrium without
well-considered substantive jurisdiction") (emphasis added).
165. See FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (William Slomanson
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is almost axiomatic that frequent changes to existing and proposed
rules in a legal regime undermine the stability of the regime.
In the present context, change to a regime may take the form of a
new rule issued by the BSC such as the 1988 Basle Accord and 1996
Market Risk Amendment. 166 Also, it may take the form of a proposed
rule, which itself may be adjusted by the BSC and replaced by a
modified proposal, such as the 1993 and 1995 Market Risk Proposa1s.167

As indicated above, change per se in these forms is not automatically
destabilizing, because rule change inheres in the concept of a dynamic
as distinct from static equilibrium. 168 There comes a point, however,
when banks may find change overwhelming and see more upheaval
than continuity in a regime. At this point, they may oppose the
regime, hence undermining its stabiliry. 169
It is difficult to predict the exact point at which opposition on this
ground is triggered. It may occur when banks find the costs of adjustment to change unacceptably high. Lawyers must be paid to decipher
new rules, compliance officers must be paid to ensure these rules are
followed, and regulators must be dealt with even when "innocent" or
"technical" violations occur. In addition, senior management, heads of
trading desks, and floor traders must be educated about new rules and
alter their behavior accordingly. 170 The monetary and time costs of
adjustment detract from banks' profit interest in, for example, foreign
exchange transactions. Put bluntly, they are transaction costs which, if
too high, will cause banks to protest "we spend more resources dealing
with rules than in financial markets."
At this point, banks may prefer to attempt to devise their own
self-regulatory regime. They will have greater control over the freed., 2d ed. 1995) (seating that "[a] continnom practice of States in their international relations,
accepted by many nations, qualifies as . . • a custom") (emphasis added); Anthony D'Amato,
Sonrces of Genera/International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTIIOLOGY 51, 63-64 (Anthony
D'Amato ed., 1994) (discussing the meaning of duration with respect to establishing the existence
of a customary rule); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1990)
(noting that duration or passage of time is an element for determining the existence of nn
international custom); The Asylnm Cme, 1950 I.C.J. 276 (1950) (requiring proof of "comtant and
uniform usage" to show a customary rule exists) (emphasis added); The Paque/e Habana & The
Lola, 75 U.S. 677 (1900) (tracing the history of an alleged customary rule beginning with a 1403
order of King Henry IV).
166. See srpra notes 43 and 81 and accompanying text.
167. See srpra notes 7 5 and 80 and accompanying text.
168. See snpra notes 108-121 and accompanying text; FULLER, snpra note 156, at 44-45
(discussing the need "to steer a wavering middle course between too frequent change and no
change at all").
169. See Bhala, snpra note 12, at Part II.A.
170. See generally INTERNAL CONTROLS IN BANKING (Ray Kinsella ed., 1995) (discussing the
design and implementation of systems to provide reasonable assurances of effective and efficient
operations, reliable financial information disclosure, and compliance with laws and regulations).
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quency of adjustment of rules in such a regime. Indeed, this phenomenon may help explain recent self-regulatory moves made by
banks. 171 Moreover, they will not feel frustrated by a sequential
adjustment process whereby the BSC issues rules upon which banks
comment post hoc. Rather, the banks themselves can "get it right" the
first time.
While the inverse relationship between the frequency of change -and
regime stability is clear, is there a distinction between changing existing rules and publishing proposed new rules? That is, does a proposal
to issue a new rule have the same destabilizing effect on a regime as
the modification of an existing rule? It seems hard to argue that a
proposal is as destabilizing as an actual rule change, yet the destabilizing effects of a proposal are palpable. A proposal by the BSC may
signal banks that the regime is subject to further (even incessant)
change, and thus keep banks somewhat off balance. Stated differently,
proposed rule changes may generate uncertainty about the durability
of a regime and what to expect next from the BSC. Accordingly, wholly
apart from the substance of a proposal, the frequency with which
proposals are made may be a reason for bank opposition.

B. Intricacy
Banks are likely to oppose a regime if its rules and proposals are
overly intricate. The precise point at which rules and proposals become
"overly" intricate is difficult to define in a generic sense, but here Lon
Fuller's argument in The Morality of Law is pertinent. He worries about
"obscure and incoherent legislation" that makes legality "unattainable,"172 and depicts Rex's problems in this regard.
The dismay of Rex's subjects was all the more intense, therefore,
when his code became available and it was discovered that it was
truly a masterpiece of obscurity. Legal experts who studied it
declared that there was not a single sentence in it that could be
understood either by an ordinary citizen or by a trained lawyer.
Indignation became general and soon a picket appeared before the
royal palace carrying a sign that read, "How can anybody follow
a rule that nobody can understand?" 173

171. See Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory, supra note 12.
172. FULLER, THE MORAUTY OF LAw, supra note 156, at 63.
17 3. I d. at 36. No doubt the current Internal Revenue Code and popular support for a
simplified fiat or consumption tax illustrate Fuller's point. Ocher examples might be certain
instances in which an administrative agency over-regulates an industry and thereby defeacs the
agency's purposes and mission.
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Fuller concludes that "[t]he desideratum of clarity represents one of
the most essential ingredients of legality." 174 In other words, intricacy
is a basis for bank opposition insofar as overly intricate rules are
incomprehensible even to experts.
This opposition, however, does not follow just from an abstract
principle favoring clarity. Ultimately, it is based on the banks' bottom
line--overly intricate rules and proposals are "expensive." Banks will
object to the increased transaction costs associated with attempts to
"figure out what is going on." For example, before a bank enters into
a foreign exchange or any other financial market transaction, it must
be sure it understands and knows how to apply the rules, and how
proposed rules would affect its transaction. But, like Rex's subjects,
the bank's lawyers, compliance officers, senior management, head traders, and floor traders will struggle with complex rules and proposals.m
Some rules or proposals may be so difficult that a bank cannot fathom
their intended goal and will, therefore, abandon its plans for engaging
in a certain class of transactions. The transaction costs become opportunity costs.
The arbitrariness associated with intricacy, as well as costs, is another
reason for opposition. Banks are unlikely to accept without question
an intricate rule or proposal. The onus is--or ought to be--on the
BSC to explain fully how a rule or proposal works, and why it must
be detailed. Its failure to perform this task can cause banks to find
rules and proposals arbitrary, that is, to see no purpose behind the
intricacy. 17 6 In turn, the regime may seem to crumble under its own
weight.
Still another basis for hypothesizing an inverse relationship between
intricacy and stability is the interactive effect of the intricacy and
frequency variables. These variables may operate together to destabilize
a regime (i.e., multicollinearity may exist with respect to these variables). In a regime consisting of intricate rules and proposals, the BSC
may be encouraged to tinker with rules and proposals. It may believe
it can "fine tune" the regime, which it regards as calibrated to yield
desirable policy outcomes. The result may be frequent issuance of new
rules and proposals. Fine tuning, in turn, can add to the complexity

174. Id. at 63. Fuller also admits that it is impossible to devise a quantitative scale for clarity,
thus the inner morality of law is more a matter of the morality of aspiration than the morality
of duty. See id. at 43.
175. See Louis Kaplow, RP/es versus Standan!J: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 568-86
(1992) (arguing that rules are more costly than standards to create, but standards are more costly
for individuals to interpret).
176. This hypothesized relationship is observed in the derivative article with respect to the
1988 Basle Accord and 1993 Market Risk Proposal. See Bhala, Applying Eqnilibrilm Theory, s11pra
note 12.
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of the regime: rules may become laden with qualifications and exceptions, and proposals may be modified by new proposals. The regime
becomes heavier and, once again, appears to crumble under its own
weight.
Without a doubt, simple rules and proposals can be problematic for
a bank if they are ambiguous and thereby generate confusion as to
expected behavior. Conversely, a bank may accept that some legal issues
may defy a simple rule. The bank, however, may argue that if rules
and proposals must be either simple but ambiguous or intricate, on
the other hand, then the bank ought to be allowed to construct its
own self-regulatory regime. After all, in such a regime, the bank can
better manage ambiguities or intricacies. 177

C. Cogency
It seems rather obvious that the stability of a legal regime in
international banking is enhanced if the rules existing in or proposed
for that regime are cogent from the perspective of banks. Yet, there
are numerous instances in which banks, through no fault of their own,
cannot understand why a rule or proposal makes sense. 178 To be sure,
"making sense" of a frequently changed or intricate rule or proposal is
tedious, difficult, and costly. But cogency is a conceptually distinct
variable from frequency or intricacy: the first two variables say nothing
about the persuasiveness of a rule or proposal.
In contrast, cogency consists of two elements: the existence and
transparency of a rationale. First, there must be a rationale for a rule
or proposal, and banks must be persuaded by it that they ought to
conform their behavior to the rule or proposal. The rationale may
pertain to efficiency, fairness, or some other transcendent notion of
what is just. Second, the authority responsible for the rule or proposal-namely, the BSC-must articulate clearly this rationale. The
absence of either element may convey the message that the rule or
proposal is arbitrary.
This message can have a corrosive effect on the stability of a regime.
Friedrich A. Hayek makes this point in The Road to Serfdom in the
context of his attack on collectivist economic planning.
[A]s planning becomes more and more ext~nsive, it becomes

regularly necessary to qualify legal provisions increasingly by reference to what is "fair" or "reasonable"; this means that it becomes
177. Indeed, perhaps this argument helps explain why banks such as J.P. Morgan have devised
internal value-at-risk models co determine their marker risk capital charges. See Bhala, Applying
Equilibrium Theory, slljlra note 12.
178. See, e.g., Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory, Jlljlra note 12, at Pact II.C.
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necessary to leave the decision of the concrete case more and more
to the discretion of the judge or authority in question. One co11ld
write a history of the decline of the Rrtle of Law . . . in terms of the
progressive introduction of these vague formrtlas into legislation and jllrisdiction, and of the increasing arbitrariness and rmcertainty of, and the
consequent disrespect for, the law and the judicatttre, which in these
circumstances could not but become an instrument of policy. 179

In the present context, banks, frustrated and disenchanted, may be
motivated to try to persuade the BSC to change its rules and proposals
that lack cogency. 180 Alternatively, they may ask the BSC to grant them
increased self-regulatory authority to devise, for example, their own
risk management techniques which they find cogent. 181 In either case,
a direct relationship between cogency and stability is apparent: a rule
or proposal in a legal regime that is not cogent may be a target for
opposition which, in turn, undermines the stability of the regime.

D. Authority
The stability of a regime in international banking law is undermined
by doubts about the authority of that regime. The extent to which
rules in the regime create obligations may be unclear. The status or
nature of the entity drafting rules and proposals for the regime may
be questioned. The process by which rules are created and modified by
subsequent proposals may be opaque. These doubts strike at the heart
of the authority of the regime. In turn, banks governed by the regime
may reject or attempt to circumvent the regime.
While a direct relationship between authority and stability may be
obvious, difficulty arises in identifying what confers authority on a
regime in international banking law. One answer, intimated above, is
to consider the binding nature of the BSC's issuances under public
international law. Possibly, the authority of the BSC's rules and proposals is enhanced, and banks must accept the rules and proposals, if
they are binding. However, it is clear that the BSC's documents,
recommendations, and the like "are not binding in any legal sense." 182
Hence, even the terms "rules" and "proposed rules" are somewhat
inapposite. A second and possibly related alternative is to explore
whether self-regulatory initiatives by banks might develop into an
179. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 78 (1944).
180. This phenomenon is apparent from the discussion in the derivative article of the BSC's
1988 Accord and 1993 Marker Risk Proposal. See Bhala, Applying Equilibriwn Theory, s11pra note
12.
181. See Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory, supra note 12, at Parr III.
182. Freeland, siiJira note 65, at 232. See also Bhala, Applying Eq11ilibri11m Theory, s11pra note
12.
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international law merchant. 183 Such a law could be authoritative and
instill a sense of binding obligation among banks. A third answer is
to focus on features of the entity responsible for creating the regime.
Is the expertise of the BSC widely acknowledged? Is it a representative
body? Does it behave in a non-partisan way? Mfirmative answers to
these questions may encourage banks to accept the regime as authoritative.184
For the present purpose of developing an equilibrium theory, identifying what confers authority on an international banking law regime
can be viewed as a species of the general jurisprudential problem of
the authority of law. On this matter, the work of Professor George
Christie is insightful.185 He rejects both Kelsen's proposition that a law
is authoritative insofar as it is derived from a basic rule or norm, and
Hart's thesis that a law is authoritative if it relates to a rule of
recognition. 186 After all, it is difficult to identify a basic norm, and
impossible to state precisely a rule of recognition. 187 Instead, Professor
Christie finds the concept of authority "has the notion of consent built
into it." 188 "Authority" refers to the ability of a person "to command
under a claim of right that is accepted as such by those over whom the
person commanding is said to have authority." 189 The notion of acceptance distinguishes authority from power, which entails domination or
coercion. 19° In brief, "(f]or authority to exist, the people to whom the
authoritative pronouncements are addressed must not only accept them
as authoritative, they must also accept a claim of right on the part of
the issuer to issue these pronouncements."191
There are two types of authority: de jure, "whose exercise is dependent upon a set of rules"; 192 and de facto, which is not dependent on a

183. See Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theury, supra note 12.
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, LAw, NORMS & AUTHORITY 83-85 (1982). See a/so GEORGE
C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TExT AND READINGS ON PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1st ed. 1973).
186. CHRISTIE, LAw, NORMS AND AUTHORITY, supra note 185, at 83-85. See generally GoLDING, srpra note 156, at 39-46 (discussing the Kelsen and Hart positions); BODENHEIMER,
JuRISPRUDENCE, supra note 30, at 100-09 (also explaining the Kelsen and Hart positions); Lloyd
& Freeman, supra note 30, at 408-11 (discussing the rule of recognition); H.LA. HART, THE
CoNCEPT OF LAw 92-107 (1961) (concerning the rule of recognition); H. Kelsen, General T/;eqry
of lAw and State (1946) and The Prrre Theury of Law (1967) in ~OYD & FREEMAN, supra note 30,
at 354-62, 367-79 (discussing the basic norm).
187. CHRISTIE, LAw, NORMS AND AUTHORITY, supra note 185, at 84.
188. ld. at 1ll.
189. ld. at 99 (emphasis added).
190. ld. ar 100.
191. ld. at 129. See also 89, 99-100. Consequently, Professor Christie argues there is no
meaningful distinction between the concepts of authority and legitimacy. A challenge to authority
on grounds of legitimacy is simply a claim that a person has no right to issue authoritative
pronouncements, i.e., rhe person has no authority. ld. ac 96-99, 101-04, 112.
192. CHRISTIE, LAw, NORMS AND AUTHORITY, s11pra note 185, at 86.
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rule structure. 193 There are a number of legislative and judicial instances in which the exercise of authority is upheld as de jttre even
though there really was no de jrtre authority. 194 Therefore, Professor
Christie concludes that "{o}ften, in the law, it turns out that the
successful exercise of de facto authority . . . takes precedence over de
jure authority." 195 In sum, not only is all authority based on consent,
but also ultimately it is de facto authority.
The definition of equilibrium proffered above 196 accords with Professor Christie's focus on consent and his distinctions among types of
authority. It may be argued that to the extent an international banking
law regime developed by the BSC is said to have authority, that
authority is consent-based and de facto in nature. There is, however, no
rule structure on which it can base its authority. 197 The BSC has no
ability to dominate or coerce its members, central banks outside of the
G-10, or the private sector. At best, it can influence G-10 central
banks, which might agree to promulgate the BSC's issuances as domestic regulations. Hence, the essence of the BSC's authority is voluntary acceptance by bank regulators and, in turn, banks. Moreover, as
the definition of equilibrium suggests, bank acceptance of BSC pronouncements is critical for the stability of international banking law.
Highlighting the importance of acceptance raises still another fundamental jurisprudential matter. Why accept authority in the first
place? Put differently, why is law binding? Professor Christie offers
"historic and psychological factors" as an explanation. Building on the
work of a Scandinavian legal realist, 198 Axel Hagerstrom, Professor
Christie accepts that there may be some validity to the idea of a
"conative impulse," that is, "the impulse to obedience engendered by
a directive, such as a command, merely by the imperative form of
expression."l99 A less abstruse answer, based on the ideas of another
Scandinavian legal realist, Karl Olivecrona, is that accepting legal
authority provides certainty and assurance.
This point is easily translatable into the present context. Banks have
reason to prefer equilibrium over disequilibrium. 200 In the latter state,
business is disrupted, risks are exacerbated, and ultimately profits are
193. ld. at 87.
194. ld. at 107-09.
195. ld. at 109.
196. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
197. For instance, there is no document akin co the Chaccer of the United Nations or the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization chat pertains to the BSC.
198. For an introduction to Scandinavian legal realism, see J.M. KEJJ.Y, A SHOR'I' HISTORY
OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 369-71 (1992); HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES, stpra note 158, at
98-102; BODENHEIMER, jURISPRUDENCE, supra note 30, at 128-33.
199. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY, supra note 185, at 171.
200. See supra notes 143-148 and accompanying text.
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jeopardized. Banks are therefore inclined to· accept the authority of the
BSC because it provides them with stability. For them, putting up
strong opposition to a legal regime is a difficult and relatively uncommon step.

E. Scope
There is a dual nature to the "scope" of a legal regime in international banking. First, what substantive issues do the rules and proposals in the regime cover? Second, who are the addressees of those rules
and proposals? In both respects, limitations in the scope of a regime
may contribute to its instability.201
There is a direct relationship between the breadth of substantive
coverage of a regime and its stability. A regime with "gaps" or "holes"
may generate opposition from banks for two reasons. First, ambiguity
may exist as to whether a transaction is covered by the rule or proposal
or falls into a gap. What is the precise boundary around the regime?
How should "fringe" transactions that straddle the boundary of the
regime be treated? 202 Second, uncertainty may exist as to a transaction
not within the ambit of the rules or p.t:oposals in the regime. Is such
a transaction legal? If so, then what law applies?
A direct relationship also exists between the scope of the addressees
and the stability of a regime. BankS subject to existing and proposed
rules in a regime may look enviously at banks and non-bank financial
institutions that escape the strictures of the regime. If a bank is
insufficiently flexible to escape the regime, then it will !iemand a level
playing field for similarly situated parties. Absent coverage of all
similarly situated parties, a covered bank inevitably will view itself as
unfairly disadvantaged and demand change. It will seek either to repeal
those rules and proposals in the regime that it perceives to be onerous
or to extend the coverage of the regime to include its competitors. 20 3

201. The lack of a level competitive playing field can arise because of differences in the way
in which an international agreement is implemented into municipal law. For discussions of
disharmonies from one country to another in the implementation of the Basle Accord, see Scott
& Iwahara, supra note 18, and Raj Bhala & Ethan B. Kapstein, The Baste Accord and Financial
Competition, 90 HARV. Bus. REV. 158 (Jan.-Feb. 1990).
202. As discussed in the derivative article, these controversies are raised by the way the 1993
Market Risk Proposal deals with options. See Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory, supra note 12.
203. As discussed in the derivative article, this aspect of scope is raised by the BSC's capiral
adequacy regime. See Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory, supra note 12. See also Richard Lapper,
Co-operation Urged Among Regulators, FIN. 'liMES, July 25, 1995, at 3 (discussing the need for
greater international regulatory cootJeration of financial conglomerates).
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V. AN IDEAL TYPE: SELF-REGULATION

A man is rich in proportion to the n11mber of things which he can afford
to let alone.
Henry David Thoreau2 04
The FICAS model presented above offers five determinants of stability in the international banking law context. In turn, these variables
suggest the outlines of a capital adequacy regime likely to be a stable
dynamic equilibrium-namely, self-regulation.205 For example, in a
self-regulatory regime concerning capital adequacy, banks operate under delegated authority from the BSC and their domestic regulators to
determine their capital requirements. Accordingly, banks, not the BSC,
are principally responsible for devising rules and proposals. The BSC
may lay down general constraints on the discretion of banks, but
otherwise it takes a "hands-off' approach with respect to how banks
determine appropriate capital levels. In sum, the burden of risk measurement shifts from the BSC to banks, and the BSC focuses on the
adequacy of the output of the banks' risk measurement systems. 2 06
An advantage to positing a self-regulatory regime as an ideal type
is the primary role banks play in such a regime. One could argue that
an equilibrium theory of international banking law is incomplete
without a normative view of the role of banks. Clearly, the EskridgeFrickey approach to law as equilibrium is about public law and public
institutions-familiar terrain for the constitutional lawyer. International banking is, however, at least as much about markets and their
players as about public sector entities. The normative issue is what role
banks should play in bringing about a stable dynamic equilibrium.
A solution can be found by observing the world's largest financial
market-the foreign exchange market. 207 Gone are the days when
204. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN, OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS AND ON THE DUTY OF
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 60 (Signet Classic 1963) (1854).
205. To be sure, chis equilibrium may not be unique, as the variables may suggest other stable
dynamic equilibria.
206. Consequently, a self-regulatory regime is distinct from the absence of regulation: no
regulation would mean the BSC does not care whether the capital banks hold is adequate to
absorb losses, and a bank is not under any regulatory obligation to hold capital against potential
losses.
A potentially fruitful line of future inquiry is to consider the ideal rype self-regulation in
relation co the concept of self-organizing systems. This concept has been used by physical,
biological, and environmental scientists co explain how "complex systems in which randomness
and chaos (exist} seem spontaneously to evolve into unexpected order," i.e., how order results
from instabiliry. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY vi (1996).
207. The average daily gross turnover in the foreign exchange market exceeds one trillion
dollars. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 39, at 1, 5, and Table I at 6. The one trillion
dollar figure includes trading in all OTC markets, namely, spot, forward, and derivatives (options
and currency swaps), as well as exchange-traded derivatives (options and futures). Cross-currency
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central banks regulated prices for foreign currencies pursuant to the
Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate system.208 Now, central banks are
lucky if they can intervene in a particular currency market to temporarily reinforce a pre-existing exchange rate trend. 2 09 The foreign exchange market suggests that private parties in international banking
law dominate central banks. Empha5izing self-regulation helps translate this marketplace fact into a legal ideal type.
Why would banks be unlikely to oppose a self-regulatory regime,
i.e., why might such a regime be stable? In brief, the answer is that
the flexibility of such a regime ensures banks' comfort with the rules
and proposals of the regime. Consider each FICAS variable in turn.
In a self-regulatory regime, the frequency with which a bank adjusts
its self-developed rules and proposals depends on its preferences. Similarly, the intricacy of the rules and proposals is linked to the bank's
preferences. In other words, a bank suits itself as to frequency and
intricacy. With respect to cogency, as a rational actor a bank will not
adopt rules or proposals it finds unpersuasive. Instead, it will attempt
to base its rules on clear, sound rationales. Assuming any delegation
of authority from the BSC and domestic regulators is proper, a bank
in a self-regulatory regime does not question its own authority to
devise rules and proposals. To the contrary, it tries to enhance the
authority of the regime, possibly touting it as customary international
law or international law merchant. 21° Finally, as for scope, a bank may
seek to bring all relevant transactions and all similarly situated nonbank parties into the regime.2ll Should a self-regulatory regime accomplish this task, its rules and proposals are likely to be adjusted infrequently and to be simple, cogent, authoritative, and comprehensive in
scope.
While the argument above provides a justification for self-regulation, it is hardly a definitive defense. Self-regulation raises regulatory
incerest rate swaps are excluded. See also Big, EcoNOMIST, Sept. 23, 1995, at 63 (noting daily
total net currency trading is $1.3 billion according to the Bank fo( International Settlements'
April 1995 survey of the foreign exchange market).
208. For discussions of the Bretton Woods system, see HAROLD ]AMES, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRETTON WOODS 1-346 (1996); HERBERT G. GRUBEL, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 143-82 (1984); and KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF
THE GAME 71-189 (1982).
209. For discussions of the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention, see KATHRYN M. DoMINGUEZ &JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, DOES FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION WORK? (1993) and
YO!CHI FUNABASHI, MANAGING THE DoLLAR: FROM THE PLAZA TO THE loUVRE (1989).
210. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
211. In this respect, the statemenc of E. Gerald Corrigan, former president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and former chairman of the BSC, that "[n]o regime is capable of
capturing all of rhe activities and trading strategies that individual institutions use" may be
incorrect. Quoted in Richard Waters, Tough Ttme Making A Level Playing Field, FIN. TIMES, May
4, 1993, at 17.
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concerns. For example, what prevents a rogue bank from taking advantage of the discretion a self-regulatory regime accords it, to gain a
competitive edge?212 (Stated in more general terms, the question might
be what degree of inconsistency among self-devised rules should be
tolerated?) A possible answer is that in some international financial
markets, such as the foreign exchange market, a reputation for integrity is prized. Consider the likely fate of a bank that tries to reduce its
costs associated with foreign exchange transactions by reducing the
capital it maintains to unsafe and unsound levels. Its counterparties are
sure to learn of this behavior. It is likely that they will curtail or
eliminate their dealings with the rogue bank. After all, there is a
systemic risk issue: if the bank· fails to honor its obligations to the
counterparties, and these obligations are significant, then the counterparties might be pulled down. 213 Not surprisingly, some non-Japanese
banks worried about this problem in the wake of the Daiwa crisis.
Western banks charged Japanese banks a risk premium of a few extra
basis points over the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIB OR) for shortterm Eurodollar loans. 214 In sum, counterparties have every incentive
to avoid a domino effect, and thus a potentially rogue bank ignores
reputational concerns at its peril_2 15
Certainly this answer does not deal adequately with possible externalities associated with a self-regulatory regime. If self-regulation corresponds with private contracting and self-determined policies to maximize profits, then it is consistent with social optimization only if there
are no externalities. The regulators represented at the BSC are paid to
worry about systemic risk and avoid government-led bailouts of troubled banks. Hence, they may question the consistency of self-regulation
with social optimization. But before regulators dismiss self-regulation
or constrain the operation of a self-regulatory regime, they ought to
212. See generally CLAUDIO E.V. BORIO & RENATO FIWSA, THB CHANGING BORDBRS OF
BANKING: ThaNOS AND IMPUCATIONS, BIS Economic Paper No. 43 at 37-38 (Dec. 1994)
(arguing for a balance between regulation, which can give banks a false sense of security and
create a moral hazard problem, and market-imposed discipline, which may be insufficient to
safeguard systemic stability).
213. "Systemic risk" is the risk that financial problems at one bank may spread to that bank's
counterparties, resulting in a domino effect in which the collapse of the first bank causes the
collapse of subsequent banks. See Hqw Safe ii Your Bank?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at 15;
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated Supervision of Finandal Conglomerates: Controlling Systemic Risk, 19 BROOKLYN J. IN1'L L. 141 (1993); Hideki Kanda, Systemic Risk
and International Finanda! Markets, in REGULATING INTBRNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUBS
AND POUCIBS 267 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992).
214. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SBTTI.BMENTS, INTBRNATIONAL BANKING AND FINAN•
CIAL Mi.RKBT DBVBLOPMBNTS app. 1 at 11-13 (Feb.· 1996). Interestingly, the risk premium
applied even to yen-denominated loans co Japanese banks. See the sources cited SIIJira note 10.
215. This response assumes that a bank knows the identity of its potential councerparties.
There are instances in the brokered foreign exchange market in which revelation of such identities
is delayed. See Bhala, Self-Regulation, supra note 38.
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(1) identify externalities and (2) articulate precise systemic risks and
plausible transmission mechanisms associated with each externality.
Put bluntly, regulatory actions ought to be narrowly and carefully
crafted to address realistic systemic risks arising from externalities.
After all, as noted in a recent international banking survey in The
Economist, "[c}ross-border prescriptions for banking systems can sometimes do more harm than good." 21 6
Another more cynical concern is that neither the BSC nor domestic
bank regulators have an incentive to permit complete self-regulation.
To do so would involve two major changes in regulatory culture. First,
the BSC and regulators would have to stop thinking of themselves as
"active players" and admit that they are no more than "referees" who
administer rules written by representatives of the real players.217 Second, the BSC and regulators would have to trust banks both to "get
it right" and to "do the right thing." That is, they would have to agree
that banks have sufficient expertise to regulate their own affairs in a
safe and sound manner as well as that· the reputation-systemic risk
argument is more meritorious than the rogue behavior argument. Yet
the traditional regulatory culture is one of high secrecy and low trust. 218
An answer to this concern is that the BSC and regulators may have
no choice but to change. They cannot possibly keep up with the rapid,
sophisticated innovations in international financial markets. How can
a BSC staff member or Federal Reserve analyst possibly understand the
risks associated with structured foreign exchange derivatives in Singapore as well as the banks that develop and sell these products? How
can the staff member or analyst monitor these risks on a 24-hour basis
as well as the banks engendering these risks? Interestingly, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand may have accepted this point. Currently, it is
experimenting with what may amount to self-regulation. The New
Zealand regulator prudentially supervises banks by requiring them to
·disclose information to the public on the theory that "a well informed

216. A Standard Dose, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at S36.
217. See Bettering Basle, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 76, 78 (seating chat "many regulators
might not like the implication chat they would have less to do'').
218. For example, information about banks contained in bank examination reports and obtained through less formal means is not readily available to the public; if it were, chen the public
might misinterpret it and create a "run" on a particular hank, which might in turn necessitate
a government bail out. In conccast, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has long relied
on public disclosure of financial data as a technique of securities regulation. Thus, it is not
surprising that bank regulatory agencies, who are charged with enforcing securities regulations
with respect co banks, are notoriously lax in such enforcement. See, e.g., Michael P. Malloy, The
12(i)'ed Monster: AdminiJtration of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the Federal Bank Regulatory
Agencies, 19 HoFSTRA L. REV. 269 (1990); Michael P. Malloy, Public DiJclosure as a Tool of Federal
Bank Regulation, 9 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 229 (1990).
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market is the safest, best and least expensive way for a central bank to
supervise banking operations." 21 9
Other bank regulators may follow New Zealand's example, which
could result in a gradual but inexorable movement toward increased
self-regulation. From the perspective of equilibrium theory, this movement would be welcome because it would be a movement toward an
ideal type which represents a stable dynamic equilibrium. Accordingly,
the next inquiry is whether to use the FICAS variables in a partial or
general equilibrium analysis.2 20
VI. SUMMARY

A synthetic scholarship in international banking that utilizes theoretical concepts to assess legal regimes can yield fruitful insights and
policy prescriptions. Equilibrium theory is one such theoretical concept. It is derived from an approach to law as equilibrium used for
Supreme Court decision-making and has been modified for the context
of international banking law. Equilibrium theory has three essential
features: a definition of a stable dynamic equilibrium, a set of determinants of stability, and an ideal type legal regime.
A legal regime is likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium if banks
would have no legitimate reasons to present significant opposition to
the regime. The FICAS model posits five determinants of stability,
namely, the (1) fiequency of adjustment to rules and proposals in the
regime; (2) intricacy of the rules and proposals; (3) cogency of the rules
and proposals; (4) authority of rules and proposals; and (5) scope of
rules and proposals. The model also hypothesizes relationships between
these determinants and the dependent variable: (1) the more frequent
the adjustments to rules and proposals in the regime, the more likely
banks will oppose the regime; (2) the more intricate the rules and
proposals, the more likely banks will oppose the regime; (3) the less
cogent the rules and proposals, the more likely banks will oppose the
219. Terry Hall, Market-Not Central Bank-To Supervise NZ Banking, FIN. TIMES, June 30,
1994, at 4.
220. The derivative article, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case St11dy of
Capital AdeqiiiJcy and C11rrency Trading, supra note 12, is devoted to this inquiry. It asks whether
a particular regime, the BSC's capital adequacy rules and proposals for foreign exchange transactions, approximates the ideal rype. The derivative article makes two arguments. First, until the
BSC issued its 1995 Market Risk Proposal and finalized this Proposal in 1996, the regime was
nor a stable dynamic equilibrium. Banks had reason ro oppose, and indeed did oppose, the regime
on the basis of each of the FICAS variables. The regime hardly resembled the ideal type of
self-regulation. Second, in contrast to rhe pre-1995 period, the current regime may be headed
toward a stable dynamic equilibrium. With respect to the frequency, intricacy, and authority
variables, the new regime resembles the ideal type of self-regulation. Difficult cogency and scope
issues, however, must be resolved before the regime is truly stable. See s11pra notes 80-81 and
accompanying text.
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regime; (4) the less authoritative the rules and proposals, the more
likely banks will oppose the regime; and (5) the narrower the scope of
application of the rules and proposals, the more likely banks will
oppose the regime.
Finally, the FICAS model suggests a self-regulatory regime as an
ideal type because it would not engender bank opposition and, therefore, represents a stable dynamic equilibrium. When applied to legal
regimes in international banking, the elements of equilibrium theory
help scholars and practitioners make sense of, and appraise critically,
the bewildering blur of rules and proposals that constitute international banking law.

